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The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy 
Diane Lourdes Dick* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article challenges the persistent claim that Chapter 11’s increasing 
utilization of market mechanisms will help facilitate economically efficient 
resolutions of corporate financial distress. Using two recent case studies, I show 
that, in fact, these mechanisms are used by stakeholders with existing market 
power to take control of the restructuring process and extract rents at the 
expense of other constituents: creditors, equity holders, and—in the case of 
companies that receive governmental bailouts—taxpayers. These distortionary 
effects are obscured by a dominant, neoclassical legal paradigm that ignores 
institutional and political dynamics. I advance a new explanatory model that 
draws upon modern social science to capture these otherwise-unexplored forces. 
This new model offers a template for law reform efforts aimed at improving 
market equality and allocating resources in commercial restructurings more 
rationally, contributing to an overall increase in social welfare. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the Great Recession, many U.S. companies 
defaulted on their loans, necessitating the restructuring of 
substantial corporate debt via Chapter 11 bankruptcy.1 Frustrated by 
the outcomes of some recent high-profile cases,2 many observers 
think that the prevailing legal process for restructuring bankrupt 
companies is broken and that Chapter 11 ought to be overhauled.3 
To this end, the American Bankruptcy Institute recently convened 
the Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, laying the 
groundwork for a comprehensive rewriting of Chapter 11.4 
Almost all critics of the extant legal construct cite the need for a 
more efficient and equitable commercial bankruptcy process.5 But 
they disagree as to how the existing framework ought to be changed. 
 
 1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2012) (providing for reorganizations of bankrupt persons). 
Corporate bankruptcies nearly doubled in the wake of the financial crisis. In 2010, more than 
90,000 U.S. companies filed for bankruptcy, compared to 46,199 companies in 2007. Eric 
Morath, Business Bankruptcies Fell 18% in May But Trend Might Not Hold, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 
2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304259304576377881790360422. 
 2. See, e.g., Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain on GM, Delphi, and Hostess, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 29, 2012, 1:43 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/11/29/bankruptcy-judge-robert-drain-on-gm-delphi-and-
hostess/. 
 3. Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Leaders Call for Chapter 11 Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/04/19/bankruptcy-leaders-call-for-chapter-11-overhaul/. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id.; see also Robert Keach & Albert Togut, Catching Up on Chapter 11 Reform, ABL 
ADVISOR (Jan. 15, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.abladvisor.com/articles/1652/catching-up-on-
chapter-11-reform-abi-commission-enters-second-year. 
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Many industry leaders celebrate Chapter 11’s increasing engagement 
of market mechanisms, and argue that modern reform efforts should 
focus on further reducing judicial and statutory interference with the 
market’s own verdict.6 To be sure, this is not a novel view as there is 
a rich academic tradition of recommending market-based reforms to 
Chapter 11.7 Proposals of this sort are largely in reaction to the 
drafters’ early optimistic view that party consensus—as opposed to 
judicial edict—would yield efficient restructuring outcomes in 
Chapter 11 cases.8 Over time, observers leveled the damning critique 
that, in practice, certain self-interested stakeholders controlled 
negotiations and crowded out dissent.9 To avoid these problems, 
critics urged greater integration of market mechanisms—such as the 
sale of the debtor’s assets prior to confirmation of a plan—to 
apportion rights in Chapter 11.10 
But not all observers believe that the market can check the 
natural tendencies of powerful parties to take control of the 
restructuring process. Some critics call for closer judicial monitoring 
of Chapter 11 negotiations, as well as statutory limitations on the 
use of market-based processes to allocate rights and obligations in 
 
 6. Allison Bisbey, Leveraged Lenders Gear Up for Chapter 11 Reform Fight, AM. BANKER 
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_222/leveraged-lenders-gear-up-
for-chapter-11-reform-fight-1054439-1.html. 
 7. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 775 (1998) (proposing a bankruptcy process by which equity security holders and 
unsecured creditors receive options to purchase shares in the reorganized debtor); David Skeel 
& Robert Rasmussen, The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 85, 85–115 (1995) (exploring market-based processes in corporate bankruptcy 
restructurings); Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 
8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992) (proposing a two-stage, market-based process for identifying 
residual claims in commercial bankruptcy and choosing a reorganization plan); Douglas G. Baird, 
The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 145 (1986) (proposing the 
sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern as an alternative to Chapter 11 bankruptcy). 
Arguments in favor of market-based reforms have also been made in other areas of corporate 
law. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (2008) 
(arguing that market-driven protections, rather than regulatory oversight, provide a more 
reliable form of corporate governance). 
 8. This history is explored in Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A 
Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization 
Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995). 
 9. Barry E. Adler, Game-Theoretic Bankruptcy Valuation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 210 (2012) 
(summarizing early criticisms of Chapter 11). 
 10. See generally Douglas Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and 
Economics of Financially Distressed Firms (Inst. for Law and Econ., Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Working 
Paper No. 43, 1997), available at www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/43.Baird_.Chapter11.pdf . 
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commercial restructurings.11 Concerns of this sort reflect a long-
standing belief that the bankruptcy process also serves a protective 
function, ensuring that absolute priority is respected.12 At the same 
time, they echo an emergent view that restructurings of large 
companies are highly political and distributional processes that have 
the potential to generate wide-spanning social welfare burdens.13 
Indeed, as we’ve known for some time, financially troubled 
commercial debtors are often forced to make extreme concessions to 
avoid liquidation,14 while their equity holders and creditors typically 
sustain sizable losses. Recent large-scale bankruptcies also 
demonstrate that other more diffuse burdens arise by way of job 
losses, 15  fire-sale externalities, 16  and, in some extreme cases, 
governmental bail-outs.17 Thus, to the extent market mechanisms 
fail to achieve a fair and efficient allocation, there can be substantial 
ripple effects. 
At the center of the modern reform debate are two fundamental 
questions: How is Chapter 11 bankruptcy used by stakeholders of 
distressed firms to advance their economic interests, and do market 
mechanisms foster more efficient and equitable restructurings? 
Implicitly, these questions require us to revisit the early criticisms 
 
 11. See, e.g., Charles Jordan Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 103 (2013) (arguing in favor of a limited right for secured creditors to 
engage in credit bidding); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174 (2012) 
(arguing that recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code reduce judicial discretion and 
empower certain creditors to force the debtor to liquidate). 
 12. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker & Charles Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling 
Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 60 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1379, 1391 (2010) (referring to Chapter 11 as 
a system based upon “distributional norms,” and considering how political forces in recent 
automotive bankruptcies threatened these norms). 
 13. This viewpoint is only recently emerging. Professor Adam Levitin explains: 
“Bankruptcy is ultimately a distributional exercise . . . and [that] makes it inherently political. 
The shape of bankruptcy law is an expression of distributional norms . . . and interest group 
politics, rather than an exercise in economic efficiency.” Adam Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the 
Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2012). 
 14. See Adler, supra note 9, at 210–11. 
 15. Matthew Leising & Shannon D. Harrington, MF Global Workers Learn of Firing From 
Media, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 11, 2011, 10:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-
11/some-mf-global-workers-said-to-learn-of-firing-from-news-reports.html (reporting job losses 
following MF Global’s bankruptcy). 
 16. Fire sale externalities occur when market disruptions force owners to sell assets to 
low valuation users. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and 
Macroeconomics, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (2011). 
 17. See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568 (2011) 
(exploring financial institution bailouts). 
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leveled against Chapter 11 and better understand how the legal 
construct might allow powerful stakeholders to trample the rights of 
others; only then can we appreciate the role of market mechanisms 
in this same system. The answers to these questions have the 
potential to generate legal reforms that completely reshape 
commercial bankruptcy law. And so it is that these hard times, and 
their attendant legal controversies, provide an opportunity to study 
forces that were overlooked in better days. As political economist 
Peter Gourevitch explains in his work on financial crises, “[h]ard 
times expose strengths and weaknesses to scrutiny, allowing 
observers to see relationships that are often blurred in prosperous 
periods, when good times slake the propensity to contest and 
challenge.”18 
This Article uses a social science theoretical lens to tackle these 
questions and to expose the continued entrenchment of what I call 
the “Efficiency Fallacy”—a flawed assumption that negotiations 
naturally lead to efficient restructuring outcomes. I argue that the 
Efficiency Fallacy is a byproduct of Chapter 11’s reliance on an 
antiquated economic model. 19  While modern corporate and 
bankruptcy law scholars have come to appreciate the complexity of 
the large, organizational actors who engage in restructurings, 20 
 
 18. PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE RESPONSES TO 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES 9 (1986). 
 19. See infra Part II. The influence of neoclassical economic theory on American law is 
explored in RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 6 (2001) (crediting economic 
analysis of law to economist Ronald Coase); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
(1986) (asserting that law is deeply influenced by efficiency goals). 
 20. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of 
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2013) (exploring debtor-side complexities, such 
as internal corporate governance and other structural factors, on debt restructurings); Sarah Pei 
Woo, Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulation Causes Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1615 (2011) 
(exploring creditor-side complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the regulatory pressures 
that drive bank creditors to favor liquidation rather than reorganization); Douglas G. Baird & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648 (2010) (exploring creditor-side 
complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the fracturing of creditors as a result of rampant 
claims trading); Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of 
Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69 (2008) (exploring creditor-side complexities 
in Chapter 11 reorganizations, including the increasing control asserted by distressed debt 
investors); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795 
(2004) (exploring creditor-side complexities in bankruptcy cases, including the unique interests 
of secured lenders); Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty à la Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective 
on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 J. CORP. L. 53 (1996) (analyzing the 
influence of fiduciary duty laws on a firm’s ordering of economic interests). 
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Chapter 11 continues to portray these parties as unitary and rational 
actors, motivated by clear and deliberate goals. While all models are 
necessarily reductive, this assumption persists even where the 
debtor is steered by deeply divided or self-interested stakeholders, 
and even where there are conflicting factions of creditors jockeying 
for control.21 
Meanwhile, social scientists have moved considerably beyond the 
early neoclassical economic model of decision-making,22 thanks to a 
growing body of literature in the fields of political economy,23 
behavioral decision theory, 24  organizational theory, 25  and public 
choice economics.26 Following decades of scholarship challenging 
the rational, unitary actor construct, 27  modern social scientists 
 
 21. See, e.g., Kelsey Butler, Dynegy Deal Involving More Than $2.5B in Claims Ok’d, DEAL 
PIPELINE (June 6, 2012, 11:53 AM) (describing a settlement between an organizational debtor 
and its unsecured creditors, each of which is portrayed as a unitary actor); Mia Lamar & 
Jacqueline Palank, Friendly’s Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2011 (describing a 
corporate debt restructuring solely with reference to the borrower and its dominant creditors, 
each of which is portrayed as a unitary actor). 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. For a description of political economy as an analytical approach, see infra Part III.A. 
 24. Behavioral decision theory focuses on individual decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty. Classics include: B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORALISM (1974) (advancing a scientific 
method of studying human behavior); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of 
Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1978) (advancing a theory of “bounded rationality”). More recent 
works include MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING (2009) 
(examining cognitive biases in managerial decision-making). 
 25. Organizational theory examines how individual decisions translate into organizational 
behavior. Since the late 1960s, organizational theory has been dominated by the systems 
approach, which “views an organization as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and 
interconnected elements . . . and the environment in which it operates and with which it 
continuously interacts.” JAY M. SHAFRITZ & J. STEVEN OTT, CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY 
263 (1992). As a result, the field has moved beyond the traditional, one-dimensional model of 
organizations. Id. at 264. Major works that contributed to these advancements include: ROBERT 
KATZ & DANIEL KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1966) (exploring 
organizational structure, the individual, and the environment); PAUL R. LAWRENCE & JAY W. 
LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT (1967) (analyzing organizational structure and 
exogenous market influences); JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967) 
(analyzing the interactions of environmental uncertainties and organizational structure); 
Fremont E. Kast & James E. Rosenzweig, General Systems Theory: Applications for Organization and 
Management, 15 ACAD. MGMT. J. 447 (1972) (exploring applications of systems theory in 
organizational management). 
 26. On public choice theory as a tool for analyzing law, see MAXWELL STEARNS & TODD 
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009); see also DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003) (providing an overview of the field). 
 27. See, e.g., GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE 
CRISIS 10–14 (1971) (analyzing the decisions of nations through organizational theory, asserting 
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recognize that institutional dynamics are a key driver of decisional 
outcomes.28 Drawing upon such literature, this Article advances a 
new explanatory model of commercial restructurings that highlights 
institutional and political dynamics. I apply this model to two recent 
case studies involving distressed commercial debtors in Chapter 11. 
The case studies demonstrate how institutional and political 
dynamics introduce market imperfections, such as self-dealing, 
conflicts of interest, opportunism, information asymmetries, and 
collective action obstacles that bolster the bargaining power of some 
stakeholders while limiting the influence of others. 
A number of powerful insights emerge. Most provocatively, I 
argue that, notwithstanding the modern tendency to rely on market-
based processes to apportion rights, Chapter 11 remains ill-equipped 
to facilitate efficient or equitable resolutions of corporate financial 
distress. Absent deeper structural reform, the overlay of Chapter 11 
with market mechanisms continues to enable those with existing 
market power in the securities and capital markets to control the 
restructuring process and extract rents at the expense of other 
constituents. By enhancing market inequalities and enabling the 
exercise of market power, Chapter 11 causes a misallocation of 
resources and contributes to an overall reduction in social welfare. 
Most notably, the distressed firm’s scarce resources are redistributed 
as excess returns to parties in a position to exploit these weaknesses 
in the legal construct. Modern reformers must be sensitive to these 
consequences and integrate suitable checks and balances on market-
based mechanisms. Otherwise, Chapter 11 will continue to suffer 
the problems that early critics identified.29 
This Article is organized as follows. Part II considers the 
influence of early neoclassical economic analysis of law in shaping 
Chapter 11. In an effort to develop a new explanatory model rooted 
in a more robust theoretical framework, Part III draws upon 
 
that the rational actor construct is overly simplistic); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A 
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963) (studying firms through a behavioralist lens, arguing 
that the firm is a coalition of individuals rather than a unified actor with consistent goals). 
 28. Recent works include ANDREW MACINTYRE, THE POWER OF INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL 
ARCHITECTURE AND GOVERNANCE (2003) (analyzing the effect of institutions on governmental 
responses to crises). 
 29. These criticisms echo early complaints raised with respect to Chapter 11’s 
predecessor law. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND 
INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND 
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1937). 
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literature from the fields of political economy, behavioral decision 
theory, organizational theory, and public choice economics. Part IV 
utilizes two recent case studies to demonstrate the ways in which 
modern restructurings depart from relatively thinner conceptions of 
neoclassical economics. Part IV also leverages an emerging 
understanding of distressed debt negotiations to ask whether—and 
how—Chapter 11 should be reformed. Part V concludes. 
II. EXPOSING THE EFFICIENCY FALLACY 
The modern approach to commercial bankruptcy reorganization 
in the U.S. is built upon a theoretical assumption (what I call the 
“Efficiency Fallacy”) that compromise and negotiation in Chapter 11 
naturally lead to efficient restructuring outcomes. From its inception 
as the modern statutory framework for commercial bankruptcy 
reorganizations, Chapter 11 has largely relied upon party consensus 
rather than judicial edict. Parties are encouraged to settle related 
claims as soon as possible 30 and agree to a Chapter 11 plan; 
meanwhile, judges are given relatively little discretion over 
restructuring outcomes.31 
The Efficiency Fallacy gained momentum in the course of 
Chapter 11’s initial adoption in 1978.32 At that time, neoclassical 
 
 30. As the influential U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently noted, 
there is a “strong public policy in bankruptcy cases to encourage settlement.” In re Washington 
Mut., No. 08–12229, 2012 WL 1563880, at *19 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 24, 2012). This interest is 
reflected in FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (granting the authority to approve settlements or refer 
parties to binding arbitration). Additionally, courts, including the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Delaware, have created specialized mediation procedures or court-annexed mediation 
programs, through which parties are ordered to attempt resolution of disputes pertaining to a 
bankruptcy case. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (1998); 
General Order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware dated April 7, 2004 
(Walrath, C.J.) (mandating that parties attempt mediation of claims to avoid preferential 
transfers); General Order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware dated July 23, 
2004 (Robinson, C.J.) (mandating that parties attempt mediation of bankruptcy appeals). 
 31. Ordinarily, a Chapter 11 plan must be confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court unless it 
fails to meet certain requirements. See 11 U.S.C. §1129(a) (2012). Moreover, recent 
amendments substantially reduced the role of judges in bankruptcy cases. See Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); see also Bruce, 
supra note 11 (thoroughly analyzing the impact of the revisions on judicial discretion). 
 32. Prior to the adoption of Chapter 11 in 1978, business reorganizations were completed 
under chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act in 
1938. See Don J. Miner, Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis 
of Chapter 11, 1979 BYU L. REV. 961, 965–68 (1979). 
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economic analysis of law was gaining ground, 33  with scholars 
increasingly using price theory and the rational actor model to assess 
the economic efficiency of legal constructs. For instance, Professor 
Mark Roe, in a 1983 article assessing commercial restructuring via 
Chapter 11, summarized the goal of bankruptcy thusly: “The judicial 
solution [via the bankruptcy process] . . . mimics the market, 
attempting to reach an idealized value of the bankrupt that the court 
believes would arise if a perfect market were at work.”34 In response 
to a proliferation of scholarly works debating the efficiency of 
Chapter 11,35 Frank Easterbrook concluded,36 and the balance of the 
scholarly community seemed to agree,37 that bankruptcy was an 
efficient rather than wealth transferring process. In Easterbrook’s 
view, this was true precisely because Chapter 11 relied on party 
consensus rather than judicial resolve.38 The Supreme Court echoed 
Easterbrook’s conclusions: “Chapter 11 . . . relies on creditors and 
 
 33. Neoclassical economic theory can be traced to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, who 
analyzed markets from the perspective of individual actors. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817). Subsequent theorists offered a number of 
refinements, and neoclassical economics flourished. See, e.g., CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF 
ECONOMICS (1871) (advancing a subjectivist and marginalist view of economic decision-making). 
Most recently, neoclassical thought was given renewed vigor by economist Milton Friedman and 
others in the “Chicago School.” See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
 34. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 530 (1983). 
 35. David T. Brown, Shareholder Incentive Conflicts in Reorganization: The Role of Bankruptcy 
Law, 2 REV. FIN. STUD. 109 (1989) (asserting that bankruptcy reduces holdout problems by 
forcing compromise); Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
173, 183 (1987) (contemplating a world without bankruptcy law, finding that “the dynamics of 
private bargaining that would exist in a world without bankruptcy would make everyone worse 
off” due to inefficiencies inherent in the negotiation process); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC 
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 8–11 (1986) (arguing that bankruptcy provides mechanisms for 
overcoming inefficiencies inherent in the process by which creditors would otherwise assert 
their rights against the debtor). 
 36. Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 413–14 
(1990). 
 37. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1998) 
(describing the dominant camps among bankruptcy theorists, both of which are ultimately 
rooted in efficiency arguments); Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips, Asset Efficiency and 
Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms, 53 J. FIN. 1495 (1998) (testing the efficiency of 
bankruptcy process in allocating productive resources); Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as 
a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 268 (1994) (acknowledging that the primary normative goal of corporate bankruptcy is to 
liquidate inefficient firms via Chapter 7 and reorganize efficient firms via Chapter 11). 
 38. Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 414–15. 
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equity holders to engage in negotiations toward resolution of their 
interests,” because “creditors and equity security holders are very 
often better judges of the debtor’s economic viability and their own 
economic self-interest than courts.”39 
Decades later, Chapter 11 continues to reflect neoclassical 
economic analysis of law, including more modern articulations of 
price theory and the efficient market hypothesis.40 The model asserts 
that persons engage in negotiations as rational actors who make 
decisions intended to advance self-interest. 41  Thus, parties to 
Chapter 11 cases are believed to seek a positive (or the least 
negative)42 return on their investments.43 To the extent parties 
bargain to advance their self-interest in a competitive exchange, the 
outcome will reflect an ideal, equilibrium price pursuant to which 
the debtor’s assets will be distributed to the highest-value users. In 
other words, when firms successfully reorganize in Chapter 11, the 
debtor must have enjoyed greater value as a going concern.44 In 
contrast, firms that fail to reach a plan of reorganization and are 
 
 39. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 457 
n.28 (1999). 
 40. MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 94–115 (1995) (describing these modern 
theories). 
 41. See, e.g., EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 55 (1988) 
(explaining that market participants strive to maximize utility). 
 42. Courts assume rational actors seek to “cut their losses.” See Bankr. Serv., Inc. v. Ernst 
& Young, 529 F.3d 432, 453 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Even the ‘benefit’ provided by ‘further 
indebtedness’—capital—‘may provide an illusory financial cushion that lulls shareholders into 
postponing the decision to dissolve the corporation’ and thus ‘miss an opportunity to cut their 
losses.” (quoting Allard v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1996))). 
 43. Patrick D. Fleming, Credit Derivatives Can Create a Financial Incentive for Creditors to 
Destroy a Chapter 11 Debtor: Section 1126(E) and Section 105(A) Provide a Solution, 17 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 189, 189 (2009) (“[C]reditors have a desire to maximize the distribution they 
receive on account of their claims.”); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of 
Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405, 422 (2007) (“In all cases we assume that creditors are 
motivated to take all available steps to maximize their recoveries in bankruptcy, at least when 
those steps have a positive net value.”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt 
and the Missing Lever of Corporate Finance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1245–46 (2006) (“Private 
lenders . . . act to maximize their rate of return.”). 
 44. David Smith & Per Stromberg, Maximizing the Value of Distressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law 
and the Efficiency Reorganization of Firms, SYSTEMIC FIN. CRISES 232–75 (2005); see also United 
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“[A] troubled enterprise may be 
restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future . . . . Congress presumed that the 
assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for 
scrap.’”). 
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instead forced to liquidate must have suffered the harsh 
determination of a competitive market that the debtor’s assets are 
worth more in an alternative use.45 
However, while its underlying economic theory has remained 
relatively consistent, commercial bankruptcy process has evolved 
considerably in the last thirty-five years. Largely in response to 
criticisms that Chapter 11 allows self-interested stakeholders to 
crowd out dissent and trample creditors’ state law rights, 
commercial bankruptcies increasingly utilize market mechanisms. 
For instance, modern Chapter 11 cases are more likely to include 
sales of all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets prior to 
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan,46 as well as credit-bidding by 
secured creditors. 47  Meanwhile, a vigorous bankruptcy claims 
trading market has evolved, allowing stakeholders to buy and sell 
claims against the debtor.48 Working together, these mechanisms 
are believed to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the 
benefit of its highest-valuing stakeholders, while providing efficient 
exit for those who prefer to liquidate their investment.49 More 
broadly, they are believed to complement Chapter 11 by providing 
value-enhancing alternatives to negotiated party consensus, thereby 
boosting the odds that the most efficient outcome will prevail. The 
allure of this logic, and the confidence that the market neatly 
vindicates restructuring outcomes, is captured in a Seventh Circuit 
opinion: “The judgment of the market vindicates Bank. If more credit 
would have enabled Debtor to flourish, then other lenders should 
 
 45. See, e.g., In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that one 
purpose of bankruptcy is to “convert the bankrupt’s estate into cash and distribute it among 
creditors.”); see also Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 
101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050–51 (1992) (exploring how courts determine whether a corporate 
debtor should be liquidated or permitted to reorganize). 
 46. Such sales are permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b); see also Matthew Bruckner, 
Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing a Preliminary Injunction Standard on Objections 
to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing in favor of a more streamlined process 
for 363 sales to achieve more efficient, market-based outcomes in Chapter 11 cases). 
 47. Credit-bidding is expressly permitted under 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). The Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed the right of secured creditors to credit bid in RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). The practice is considered in more detail in Tabb, 
supra note 11. 
 48. The claims trading market is given recent attention in Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy 
Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 67 (2009). 
 49. See supra notes 46 through 48 and sources cited therein. 
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have been willing to supply it.”50 However, as the following section 
explores, this logic begins to break down once we consider how 
Chapter 11’s inherent economic distortions impair the ability of 
market-based processes to fairly and efficiently apportion rights 
among constituents in complex commercial bankruptcies. 
A. The Fallacy’s Methodological and Theoretical Assumptions 
As a legal construct that strives to facilitate consensus, Chapter 
11 essentially provides the backdrop against which parties negotiate. 
But economic theory counsels that negotiations cannot be relied 
upon to yield efficient outcomes unless they take place in a 
competitive environment. What is more, the assessment of any 
particular outcome as efficient is a matter of perspective. Thus, 
where negotiations take place within Chapter 11, the law can impair 
competition and introduce a distortionary effect to the extent it 
privileges or constrains participation in negotiations. 
Of course, any legal construct grants structural privileges. As the 
Supreme Court explained, “Our adversary system is designed around 
the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are 
responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to 
relief.”51 In this way, American law tends to “rely on the parties to 
frame the issues for decision.”52 As a result, only those who are 
designated by the legal construct as “parties” are afforded the 
privilege of framing legal disputes. 
Who ought to be the “parties” to Chapter 11 cases? To be sure, 
in situations of financial distress, economic burdens are often 
disseminated to a range of direct and indirect constituents, such 
that—at least in theory—a narrative might focus on many potential 
parties. Clearly, the commercial debtor and its lenders are relevant 
parties. Once in bankruptcy, the parties might include a bankruptcy 
trustee, to the extent one is appointed, 53  or the debtor in 
possession.54 Whether within or outside of bankruptcy, the debtor’s 
 
 50. Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th 
Cir. 1990). 
 51. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003). 
 52. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). 
 53. Although a trustee is not commonly appointed in Chapter 11 cases, one may be 
appointed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 54. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (2012) (defining “debtor in possession” to mean the debtor 
except where a trustee has been appointed). The debtor in possession “generally has the 
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management and advisors, its affiliated entities and equity security 
holders,55 and its creditors,56 including involuntary creditors, may 
be parties, as well as any other persons with a vested interest in the 
restructuring outcome.57 In each case, parties can be identified as 
separate legal entities, as in the case of a corporate debtor or 
institutional lender, 58  or on the basis of aggregation methods 
authorized by procedural rules, as in the case of consolidated 
debtors.59 Other parties may be identified collectively pursuant to 
agency arrangements, such as groups of syndicate lenders 
contractually bound to collective action mechanisms set forth in 
their credit agreements. 60  Finally, parties may be identified 
collectively pursuant to transitory groupings imposed by law. For 
instance, in a Chapter 11 case, similarly situated claimants may be 
recognized collectively in official committees comprising persons 
holding the largest claims.61 Each of these parties may be further 
deconstructed by piercing tiers of entities and unraveling agency 
relationships to identify all persons with an economic interest in the 
restructuring. 
 
 
authority to exercise the same powers as a trustee.” Weingarten Nostat, Inc. v. Serv. Merch. Co., 
396 F.3d 737, 742 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1108 (2000)). 
 55. The term “equity security holder” is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as “holder of an 
equity security of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (2012). An “equity security” means a “share 
in a corporation, whether or not transferable or denominated ‘stock,’ or similar security; interest 
of a limited partner in a limited partnership; or warrant or right, other than a right to convert, to 
purchase, sell, or subscribe to a share, security, or interest of a kind specified.” 11 U.S.C. § 
101(16). 
 56. “Creditor” means an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time 
of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). 
 57. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 248–57 (1999) (describing a multiple constituency approach to corporate law). 
 58. The debtor may be a corporation formed under state law; similarly, a lender may be a 
national banking association formed under federal law. These and other entities are granted legal 
personhood. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” to include “corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships . . . as well as individuals”). 
 59. Bankruptcy cases involving affiliated entities are typically consolidated for procedural 
purposes. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
 60. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing credit 
documents intended for collective action by an agent acting on behalf of lenders); Beal Sav. Bank 
v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 318, 332 (N.Y. 2007) (explaining credit documents “intended for collective 
action”). 
 61. Committees are appointed to represent the interests of various stakeholders. 11 
U.S.C. § 1102 (authorizing the appointment of creditors’ and equity security holders’ 
committees). 
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In practice, Chapter 11 confers party status in a more restrictive 
manner, thereby limiting participation—and, ultimately, 
competition—in the restructuring process. A “unitary actor” 62 
construct posits that the relevant parties to a restructuring are the 
principal debtor entity, an aggregated pool of the debtor’s equity 
security holders, and an aggregated pool of the most powerful 
creditors (generally, but not always, secured creditors).63 In most 
restructuring narratives, two of these aggregated actors emerge as 
the key parties. 64  The debtor, 65  on the one hand, is generally 
constructed as a single, unified, rational actor that takes calculated 
action in response to corporate distress. 66 The most influential 
creditors, on the other hand, are taken collectively as a single, 
unified group67 that also engages in purposive conduct. Within this 
binary framework, each of these aggregated actors is believed to 
approach negotiations as it would any other pursuit of deliberate, 
consistent, and goal-oriented conduct in accordance with its own 
“single standard of rationality.”68 To this end, the legal process 
 
 62. The term is referenced in ALLISON, supra note 27, at 73 n.111. See also JAMES SAMUEL 
COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 504 (1994) (exploring the “unitary actor”). 
 63. The acclaimed bankruptcy attorney Harvey Miller likens such parties to “stars” in a 
bankruptcy case “play.” Miller, supra note 8. More recently, Professor Michelle Harner identified 
these parties to corporate bankruptcies in Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased 
Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 471 (2011). This conception 
is also apparent in language used by courts. See, e.g., Winters v. George Mason Bank, 94 F.3d 
130, 133 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he stay is for the protection of the debtor and its creditors.”). 
 64. Professor Adam Levitin notes the limited range of constituents who are represented 
in a typical bankruptcy, acknowledging that the process tends to focus upon the debtor and its 
creditors. Levitin, supra note 13, at 1402. 
 65. The corporation’s status as an entity, association, and person under the law has been 
explored in great detail. See Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009) (exploring 
legal theories of corporate personhood). 
 66. See generally supra note 21, and sources cited therein.  
 67. “In Chapter 11, bankruptcy provides a forum for creditors to make a collective 
decision about the viability of a firm.” Levitin, supra note 13, at 1445. Creditors are frequently 
assumed to be homogeneous notwithstanding that “creditors” can include traditional lenders, 
trade creditors and other institutions with divergent investment strategies. See MICHAEL A. 
JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 
165 (2000). 
 68. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
551 (1974) (identifying conceptual distortions in traditional commitment theory, which are 
“reinforced by the additional assumptions that each side in the deterrence equation is a unitary, 
purposive actor and that action choices and payoffs of the actors may be analyzed and calculated 
by means of a single standard of rationality”). Although the unitary actor model has been 
developed and critiqued most extensively in the field of international relations, scholars have 
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focuses strictly upon the interplay of certain unitary actors, who are 
assumed to “perform large actions for large reasons.”69 
For instance, similarly situated unsecured creditors are 
recognized collectively in official committees comprising persons 
holding the largest claims. 70  Additional committees may be 
appointed to represent creditors or equity security holders.71 What 
is more, Chapter 11 directs courts to analyze pivotal questions from 
the perspective of unitary actors. In approving settlements, 
bankruptcy courts determine whether the arrangement is in the best 
interests of the debtor, the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, and 
aggregated groups of similarly-situated creditors and equity security 
holders. 72  In confirming a Chapter 11 plan, 73  courts examine 
acceptance of the plan and impairment of claims on a class-by-class 
basis,74 with these classes designated by the debtor based on the 
legal similarity of claims.75 Numerous other provisions of Chapter 
11 require that a court consider “the best interests of the creditors 
and the [Debtor’s] estate,” and the analysis is similarly restricted to 
these large organizational actors. 76  The unitary actor construct 
persists even where the debtor is steered by self-interested 
managers, and even where there are conflicting factions of creditors 
or equity security holders jockeying for control.77 As Professor Barry 
 
acknowledged the model’s persistent application to corporate decision-making as well. See, e.g., 
BORIS HOLZER, MORALIZING THE CORPORATION: TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 111 (2010). 
 69. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 5. 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See, e.g., In re Refco, 505 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he bankruptcy court 
approved the Settlement as being in the best interests of the debtors, their estates and 
creditors.”). 
 73. The debtor exits Chapter 11 bankruptcy upon confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. 11 
U.S.C. § 1121. 
 74. 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 75. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (authorizing the debtor to classify claims for plan confirmation 
purposes). 
 76. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (setting forth the standard of review for motions to 
convert a case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7). 
 77. JENSEN, supra note 67 (stating that “[i]ntra-debtholder conflicts over wealth transfers 
are highly visible in bankruptcy proceedings,” yet scholars tend to “discuss[] the bondholder-
stockholder conflict as if there were only two homogenous classes of capital claims on the 
corporation”); see also Antje Brunner & Jan Pieter Krahnen, Corporate Debt Restructuring: Evidence 
on Lender Coordination in Financial Distress (C.F.S., Working Paper No. 2001/04, 2001) 
(examining the difficulty of obtaining consensus among lenders). 
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Adler explains, the law promotes a unitary actor framework through 
its reliance on majority rule; for instance, “the right to veto a plan on 
the basis of unfair discrimination is a class-based right—not 
available to individual dissenters within an accepting class of 
claims.”78 
Courts largely decline to broaden the scope of the analysis. As 
the Second Circuit explained, “[The bankruptcy court’s] (only) 
obligations in evaluating the Settlement [are] to the Debtors’ estate, 
creditors and shareholders.”79 Judicial support of the unitary actor 
construct is best illustrated by the evolving interpretation of laws 
that govern participation in the restructuring process. In a Chapter 
11 case, any “party in interest” may appear and be heard on any 
issue.80 “Party in interest” is defined to include “the debtor, the 
trustee, a creditors’ committee, an equity security’s committee, a 
creditor, an equity security holder [of the debtor], or any indenture 
trustee.”81 A party in interest may file a Chapter 11 plan where a 
trustee has been appointed 82  or where the debtor’s exclusivity 
period has terminated.83 Similarly, a party in interest may challenge 
the good faith of persons voting to approve a plan,84 object to 
confirmation of a plan,85 or request that a court revoke confirmation 
of a plan.86 
As originally drafted, “party in interest” was not intended to be 
an exclusionary or underinclusive definition. 87  To the contrary, 
drafters and early commentators hoped that an expansive definition 
would allow a broad range of individual and minority interests to 
 
 78. Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler and General 
Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 310 (2010). 
 79. In re Refco, 505 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 80. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). 
 81. Id. The term “equity security holder” means a “holder of an equity security of the 
debtor,” thereby excluding shareholders of, or investors in, entities that come within any of the 
other classifications. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). 
 82. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1). 
 83. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2)–(3). 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e). 
 85. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b). 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 1144. 
 87. “Section 102(3) states that the term ‘including’ is not limiting, and thus the use of 
the word ‘including’ in section 1109(b) does not limit ‘party in interest’ status to those parties 
referred to in the subsection.” 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1109.02 at 1109–22. See also In re 
Cloud Nine, Ltd., 3. B.R. 199 (Bankr. N.M. 1980) (articulating a liberal right to be heard from an 
early Chapter 11 case). 
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intervene in Chapter 11 cases, and expressly warned that undue 
restrictions on who may be a party in interest might enable 
dominant interests to control the restructuring process.88 Yet within 
a few short years, courts began to construe the definition in a 
restrictive fashion. For instance, a 1983 opinion by the Second 
Circuit explained, “Bankruptcy courts were established to provide a 
forum where creditors and debtors could settle their disputes and 
thereby effectuate the objectives of the statute. Necessarily, 
therefore, the Bank must be either a creditor or a debtor to invoke 
the court’s jurisdiction.” 89  Similarly, courts have narrowed the 
participatory role of parties in interest, suggesting that Chapter 11 
grants such persons only a right to appear and be heard on issues 
pertaining to the restructuring, rather than a right to legal 
standing. 90  Even more, modern courts rarely grant meaningful 
participation rights to persons beyond the expressly identified 
statutory classifications of parties in interest.91 And, while these 
classifications may seem broad at first blush, in a complex 
restructuring these categories are likely to encompass a limited 
number of persons, such as agents representing an aggregate of 
entities. As a result, persons are denied direct participation in the 
bankruptcy process even though they will bear the economic 
consequences. 
The Second Circuit defended this approach in a case declining to 
recognize standing on behalf of equity security holders of a creditor. 
 
 88. Drafters of a predecessor reorganization statute sought to ensure that minority 
interests have access to the restructuring process. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 747 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing the commentary to 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (“[S]ection 1109(b) 
continues the broad concept of the absolute right to be heard in order to ensure fair 
representation of the case and prevent excessive control by insider groups. . . .”)). 
 89. In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 90. In re Sw. Equip. Rental, 152 B.R. 207, 209 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1992) (“Section 1109 
says that any party in interest, including a creditor, may raise and may appear and be heard on 
any issue in a Chapter 11 case.” However, “[t]he statute does not necessarily mean that every 
party in interest can obtain relief on every issue. In other words, the right to raise an issue and 
to appear and be heard is not the same as standing.”). 
 91. In re James Wilson Assoc., 965 F.2d 160, 169 (7th Cir. 1992) (denying, essentially, 
the inclusive statutory definition of “party in interest” by conducting a more limited 
interpretation of the definition for the purposes of federal standing: “[W]e do not think that 
Section 1109(b) was intended to waive other limitations on standing, such as that the claimant 
be within the class of intended beneficiaries of the statute that he is relying on for his claim.”); 
accord In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); S. Boulevard, Inc. v. Martin 
Paint Stores, 207 B.R. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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Framing a narrative of corporate financial distress in accordance with 
the unitary actor construct, the court explained: “Bankruptcy court is 
a forum where creditors and debtors can settle their disputes with 
each other. Any internal dispute between a creditor and that creditor’s 
investors belongs elsewhere.”92 Similarly, courts have repeatedly 
declined to give standing to creditors who seek to raise claims that 
implicate the debtor’s internal governance. 93  Even bankruptcy 
disclosure rules,94 which were designed to foster transparency and 
fairness,95 decline to peer into unitary actors. And, notwithstanding 
recent reform efforts, 96  disclosure obligations continue to be 
assigned to agents representing large pools of creditors rather than 
to each individual creditor.97 
Courts presiding over Chapter 11 cases also consistently decline 
to investigate how parties ascend to positions of dominance and 
assume control of unitary actors.98 In this spirit, a fairly pronounced 
affirmation of the unitary actor construct was made by a United 
States bankruptcy court: “[A] bankruptcy court’s obligation is to 
determine whether a settlement is in the best interests of the estate, 
not to ensure that the creditors’ representatives are honoring their 
fiduciary duties.”99 As the Second Circuit intimated, such a model is 
rooted in broader judicial efficiency concerns:  
[h]ad the bankruptcy court permitted [the creditor’s equity 
investors] to object to the Settlement and conduct discovery on the 
 
 92. In re Refco, Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 93. In re Sw. Equip. Rental, 152 B.R. at 210 (“[A]s a general rule, a creditor does not have 
standing to object to a corporation’s voluntary bankruptcy case on the ground that the board of 
directors did not properly authorize it.”); see also In re Ives, 113 F. 911 (6th Cir. 1902) (declining 
to grant a creditor standing to challenge a partnership’s voluntary petition on the grounds that 
the general partner lacked mental competency). 
 94. See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
 95. In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701, 702–04 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (articulating 
the policy rationale for Rule 2019). 
 96. See Tiffany Kary, Federal Judge Says Rules Needed To Bar Bankruptcy Failure Bets, 
BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 05, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=newsarchive&sid=anpx7s.ZUivc; Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 2003, 2019, 3001, 4004, and 6003 [hereinafter “Proposed Amendments”]; Proposed 
Adoption of New Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 1004.2 and 3002.1, Absent Contrary 
Congressional Action (Redline Version), 2011 U.S. Order 0018 (C.O. 0018) (Apr. 26, 2011). 
 97. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019. 
 98. See infra notes 99 through 107 and accompanying text. 
 99. In re Refco Inc., 505 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2007). See Nellis v. Shugrue, 165 B.R. 115, 
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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numerous factual issues that . . . would prove that the Settlement 
“was the product of tortious misconduct, collusion, and fraud by a 
faithless fiduciary,” . . . the . . . goal of a “speedy and efficient 
reorganization,” would have been frustrated.100  
Acknowledging the very serious claims of unlawful conduct alleged 
by the creditor’s equity investors, the court concluded that such a 
“litany of wrongs . . . is fodder for a lengthy trial itself. It surely 
would have caused a substantial delay in the . . . bankruptcy 
proceeding.”101 Declining to grant the creditor’s equity investors 
standing in the bankruptcy case, the court explained, “[B]ankruptcy 
court is not the appropriate forum in which to resolve [such] 
disputes. It may be that the [creditor] violated . . . fiduciary duties 
by entering a settlement that was not in the best interests of [its 
equity investors]. That issue, however, is not for the bankruptcy 
court.”102 
Justifying a limited focus of this sort, courts generally assume 
that Chapter 11 participants act in good faith to translate profit-
maximization goals into efficient restructuring outcomes.103 And, 
although courts readily acknowledge the propensity for actors to 
engage in anticompetitive practices in the course of a 
restructuring,104 they largely decline to focus upon or take steps to 
expose such conduct. Trusting a market clearinghouse function, 
courts typically assume that if an organizational actor were 
exercising authority in a manner that was detrimental to its 
constituent members, such members would strip the actor of its 
authority.105 Thus, as the First Circuit explained, “If the unsecured 
 
 100. In re Refco, 505 F.3d at 119. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 118. 
 103. See, e.g., In re C & C Jewelry Mfg., Inc., 373 F. App’x 775, 777 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A 
presumption of good faith accompanies the filing of an involuntary petition” by a creditor, and 
the debtor has the burden of proving bad faith); In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014, 1016 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (“Workouts contemplate . . . participation from all parties in interest, 
good faith, conciliation, and candor.”). 
 104. See, e.g., In re Washington Mut., Inc., 419 B.R. 271, 279 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) 
(“[C]ollective action by creditors through the use of ad hoc committees or groups allows 
creditors to utilize other group members’ holdings to obtain a greater degree of influence in a 
bankruptcy case than single creditors acting alone.”); In re Gibson Group, 66 F.3d 1436, 1441 
(6th Cir. 1995) (“A debtor-in-possession often acts under the influence of conflicts of interest 
and may be tempted to use its discretion . . . to favor certain creditors over others . . . .”). 
 105. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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creditors’ committee fails to be properly representative of the 
unsecured creditors, any party in interest can move to have the 
committee reconstituted.” 106  In opinions of this sort, judicial 
efficiency is a primary justification for restricting focus to 
organizational actors. As the influential United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York explained: 
[I]t is important that a bankruptcy court is not too facile in granting 
applications for standing. Overly lenient standards may potentially 
over-burden the reorganization process by allowing numerous 
parties to interject themselves into the case on every issue, thereby 
thwarting the goal of a speedy and efficient reorganization. . . . 
Granting peripheral parties status as parties in interest thwarts the 
traditional purpose of bankruptcy laws which is to provide 
‘reasonably expeditious rehabilitation of financially distressed 
debtors with a consequent distribution to creditors.107 
Notwithstanding these judicial efficiency arguments, the Second 
Circuit opined that it is not improper to buy a claim to obtain 
standing in a bankruptcy proceeding.108 Evidencing the realities of a 
legal construct that so heavily privileges unitary actors, stakeholders 
frequently acquire bankruptcy claims not because they value them 
more highly, but because they can use them for the strategic purpose 
of “obtain[ing] a seat at the negotiating table.”109 As subsequent 
sections explore, these constraints on participation have a 
distortionary effect, thereby undercutting the fairness and efficiency 
of negotiated restructuring outcomes. 
B. Legal and Historical Roots of the Fallacy 
As the preceding section articulates, Chapter 11 adopts a largely 
binary framework whereby issues are framed and negotiated by 
certain large, unitary actors. This focus upon unitary actors is a 
product of early neoclassical economic analysis of law, which tended 
to adopt simplistic assumptions of even the most internally complex 
 
 106. In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1317 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1102(a)(2) (2012); In re Daig Corp., 17 B.R. 41, 42 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981)). 
 107. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 850–51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 108. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 109. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in 
Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1158–59 (2011). 
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organizations. 110  In essence, the traditional, neoclassical model 
portrayed complex organizations, such as firms, as “simple-
maximizing” entities, “operating with a set of given prices, 
technologies and markets.” 111  What is more, this traditional 
construction also largely ignored, and even obscured, the conflicts 
and inefficiencies that occur within organizational actors.112 
Despite their persistence in bankruptcy law, many of these core 
assumptions have been dismantled in the social sciences.113 For one 
thing, advancements in organizational theory undercut the assertion 
that a complex organization can have a single, unified objective.114 
Evidencing this changing tide, state-centric political scientist Robert 
Gilpin concedes, “strictly speaking, states . . . have no interests, or 
what economists call ‘utility functions,’ nor do bureaucracies, 
interest groups, or so-called transnational actors, for that matter.”115 
Legal scholars have similarly acknowledged the limitations of the 
 
 110. Economist Harvey Leibenstein addressed the limitations of the rational actor 
construct:  
According to the strict neoclassical viewpoint, there is no relation between the formal 
controller of the firm and the behavior of the firm. Thus, a one man firm . . . or a 
large corporation whose stock is widely distributed . . . are . . . presumed to 
operate the same way. 
HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, GENERAL X-EFFICIENCY THEORY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 161 (1978); 
see also EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATIONS 290–91 
(2004) (speaking of the firm as an “economic decision-making unit” rather than as a collection 
of individual economic decision-making units); HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 28 (1960); JOSEPH W. MCGUIRE, THEORIES OF BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 19–
20, 46–72 (1964) (neoclassical theory assumes that firms make decisions in the same manner as 
individuals). 
 111. J. D. Tomlinson, Economic and Sociological Theories of the Enterprise and Industrial 
Democracy, 35 BRIT. J. SOC. 591, 591–92 (1984). 
 112. Professor David Strauss discusses the unitary actor paradigm in presidential decision-
making. He explains: “Often the decision of the President is treated as if it were the act of a 
unitary, purposive actor. In fact, presidential decisions are routinely the product of interest 
group and bureaucratic pressures within the executive branch. ‘Presidential’ decisions are not 
automatically more unitary than ‘congressional’ decisions.” David S. Strauss, Presidential 
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 113 n.1 (1993). 
 113. The seminal work challenging the unitary actor construct is ALLISON, ESSENCE OF 
DECISION, supra note 27; see also Simon Hug, Nonunitary Actors in Spatial Models: How Far Is Far in 
Foreign Policy?, 43 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 479 (1999) (discussing growing skepticism towards the 
unitary actor construct in international relations scholarship). 
 114. Where individuals share common interests, their “unorganized action [will] not be 
able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest 
adequately.” MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 7 (1965). 
 115. ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 18 (1981). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014  1:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
780 
unitary actor construct in work spanning a range of substantive 
areas.116 
For example, corporate law scholars have contributed to an 
enriched understanding of the complexities of large commercial 
actors. Seminal works of Adolph Berle identify the agency conflicts 
that cause large corporations to pursue decisions that are not 
necessarily in the best interests of the enterprise or its 
stakeholders. 117  Following in Berle’s footsteps, a rich and 
interdisciplinary body of literature explores the effect of managerial 
ownership on corporate decision-making.118 Broadly speaking, these 
works suggest that in light of the behavioral tendencies of the 
humans who operate it, a firm, 119  much like a governmental 
entity,120 simply cannot be a unitary actor that acts deliberately to 
pursue its own economic goals. Recent scholarship in bankruptcy 
 
 116. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling 
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1318 (2011) (“Private controlling shareholders . . . are . . . 
not unitary actors when they are corporations. But authority within corporations is hierarchical, 
so if one agent of the controlling shareholder corporation acts . . . her actions can fairly be 
attributed to the corporation under normal agency law principles.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative 
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 13 n.25 (2008) (“This Article . . . neither assumes a single 
legislative intent or will, nor relies on the assumption that all members of the legislature have 
the same information. Rather, this Article assumes that the legislature employs some set of 
institutional arrangements that generate stable equilibrium policy choices . . . and that the 
equilibrium policy choice is affected by information that members of the legislature receive and 
process concerning the impact of various policies on some normatively relevant set of 
outcomes.”). 
 117. See generally ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (when shareholders are too dispersed to ensure that managers render 
decisions that maximize the corporation’s value, agency problems arise whereby managers tend 
to advance their own self-interests); Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) (exploring these arguments further). 
 118. See, e.g., J. R. Davies, David Hillier & Patrick McColgan, Ownership Structure, 
Managerial Behaviour and Corporate Value, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 645 (2005); Kenneth A. Kim, 
Pattanaporn Kitsabunnarat & John R. Nofsinger, Ownership and Operating Performance in an 
Emerging Market: Evidence from Thai IPO Firms, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 355 (2004); Harold Demsetz & 
Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 
(1985). 
 119. “Under any economic, social, or political system, individuals, business firms, and 
organizations in general are subject to lapses from efficient, rational, law-abiding, virtuous or 
otherwise functional behavior.” ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 1 (1969). On 
the need to align corporate managers’ individual economic incentives with the corporation’s 
economic interests, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 20–27 (2006). 
 120. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1036 (2011) (“Even casual observers of the administrative state recognize that agencies, 
like nearly all large organizations, are not unitary actors. They are fractured internally.”). 
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law continues in this academic tradition, carefully dissecting the 
conflicting economic motivations of persons engaged in Chapter 11 
cases and finding that these competing interests impact 
restructuring outcomes.121 
Why, then, does the unitary actor framework continue to 
dominate Chapter 11? For one thing, the model is clearly manifested 
in the prevailing bankruptcy paradigm known as the “creditors’ 
bargain” model, which analyzes many issues that arise in bankruptcy 
cases from the perspective of a fictitious, efficiency-enhancing 
bargain amongst all creditors.122 Yet the model’s roots reach beyond 
bankruptcy theory. In many ways, the model reflects the relatively 
conservative legal conceptions of the firm that have dominated 
corporate law. While the precise contours of the relationship 
between a firm and its stakeholders have evolved over time, the firm 
has been largely construed as a privately-negotiated balancing of 
rights and obligations of stakeholders, such that there is no 
distinction between the economic interests of the firm as a unitary 
actor and the aggregated interests of its stakeholders.123 
For instance, consider the classic approach to corporate 
personhood: the “aggregate person” model.124 Under this view, the 
corporate entity should be the exclusive unit of analysis because 
persons who comprise the corporation “merge” into it, thereby 
disappearing from view.125 The aggregate person model was further 
amplified in the work of “nexus-of-contract” or “Contractarian” 
scholars in the 1970s.126 These authors and their progeny assert that 
 
 121. See supra note 20, and sources cited therein. 
 122. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain, 
91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (advancing the creditors’ bargain model); see also Barry E. Adler, 
Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1992); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. 
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
778 (1988). Professor Adam Levitin situates the creditors’ bargain model in the law and 
economics movement, classifying it as a contractarian theory of bankruptcy law. See Levitin, 
Bankrupt Politics, supra note 13, at 1405–06. 
 123. Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. 
OF CORP. L. 753 (2006) (discussing historical perceptions of the corporation); Geoff Lundeen 
Carter, Agreements Within Government Entities and Conspiracies Under Section 1985(3)—A New 
Exception to the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1139, 1141 (1996) (noting 
“the common law tradition of regarding corporations as single, unitary actors”). 
 124. See Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 65, at 109–12. 
 125. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is . . . an association of 
individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”). 
 126. “Nexus-of-contract” and “Contractarian” scholars include Frank Easterbrook and 
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because stakeholders contract privately with each other to operate 
via the firm, the law should respect these private agreements and 
accept the firm as the pertinent actor, capable of shaping and 
advancing its own and its stakeholders’ economic interests.127 
Moreover, this view of the firm asserts that efficient private 
ordering among stakeholders naturally leads organizational actors to 
engage in efficient transactions with third parties.128 In other words, 
profit-maximizing stakeholders, negotiating with each other in a 
competitive market, advance organizational decisions that are likely 
to lead to the greatest net overall increase in stakeholders’ 
welfare. 129  To the extent the organization pursues some other 
course, it is assumed that stakeholders would take rapid action to 
restore efficient exercise of organizational power.130 A leading work 
in political economy reveals the extreme reductionism of such an 
argument in the analogous context of governmental decision-
making: “[t]he logic underlying this view is simple and compelling: 
if a politician were making transfers in an inefficient manner, he or 
she would be voted out of office.”131 
Over time, this unitary actor conception of the firm came to be 
associated with powerful normative beliefs as to the relationship 
between law and transactional activity.132 As early defenders of 
neoclassical economic analysis of law assert, intra-firm dynamics are 
simply immaterial to the regulation of the firm’s ultimate pursuits in 
 
Daniel Fischel. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991); see also Jonathan Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266 
(1999). 
 127. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415 (1989) (under the “nexus of contracts” approach, “the firm is a legal 
fiction that serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of 
production”); Michael C. Jensen & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor 
Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, in JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM, supra note 67, at 136–37 
(“We view the corporation as a legal entity that serves as a nexus for a complex set of explicit 
and implicit contracts among disparate individuals.”). 
 128. See infra notes 129 and 130 and sources cited therein. 
 129. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (positing that the contractual 
nature of corporate relationships leads to efficient corporate outcomes). 
 130. Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris, On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests, 103 J. 
POL. ECON. 1210 (1995) (under the Chicago School, “political competition will ensure that the 
most efficient method of redistribution available is chosen”). 
 131. Id. at 1211. 
 132. See infra notes 134 through 137 and accompanying text. 
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the marketplace. 133  Acknowledging the effects of this view on 
American law, economist Oliver Williamson used the term “legal 
forbearance” to refer to the relative unavailability of legal process 
with respect to intra-firm disputes, noting that such disputes are 
part of the “implicit contract law of internal organization,” which 
rests in the domain of private ordering rather than public law.134 In 
essence, the bargaining and exchange of promises that occur in 
forming and managing the firm are viewed as a matter of private 
exchange, beyond the reach of the law (other than those laws 
specifically pertaining to intra-firm governance). 135  As one 
prominent work explained, “the behavior of the organization is like 
the equilibrium behavior of a market.”136 It should be no surprise, 
then, that the aggregate person construct of the firm, as amplified by 
Contractarians, generally accompanies a laissez-faire approach to 
business law and market regulation.137 In particular, this approach 
wages a powerful resistance to legal reforms that look beyond the 
needs of dominant constituents.138 
As a result, by the late 1970s, when Chapter 11 was enacted, the 
works of Berle and his progeny had been unfittingly relegated to the 
shelves of those who study corporate governance and other internal, 
decidedly private affairs of the firm. As to the firm’s activities with 
and among third parties, it was generally assumed that while there 
may be differences in the underlying goals of stakeholders, such 
variances were the subject of negotiation in a competitive market 
and resolved via private agreement.139 In the absence of evidence 
 
 133. See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 
211 (1950); Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS (1953). 
 134. Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 159 (1991). 
 135. “The normative implications of the aggregate paradigm are that corporations should 
be regarded as the product of private initiative and natural market forces, that corporations 
reflect forms of private property and private contract, and that corporate law should therefore be 
viewed as private law, not public law.” Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 65, at 111. 
 136. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM, supra note 67, at 136. 
 137. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489–90 (1989) (“[C]ontract theory was hostile to state 
regulation and to the management corporation simultaneously . . . . For example . . . 
contractualism served as the vehicle for protecting corporations from government regulation 
under the equal protection clause.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Professor Michael Klausner contextualizes contractarian theory thusly: “The core 
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that the actions of the firm are not in compliance with these internal 
agreements,140 such actions should be taken as efficient translations 
of the aggregated stakeholders’ interests. In the bankruptcy context, 
these core tenets of neoclassical economic theory, and especially the 
unitary actor model, enduringly obscured internal dynamics of 
complex commercial actors.  
III. CHALLENGING THE EFFICIENCY FALLACY 
As the previous sections explain, Chapter 11 suffers from 
structural limitations that introduce a distortionary effect. Namely, it 
invites to the bargaining table only certain large organizational 
actors. At the same time, it declines to investigate the internal 
dynamics that allow certain stakeholders to assume beneficial 
control of these negotiating parties. 
Of course, a richer appraisal of Chapter 11 negotiations requires 
a deeper exploration of these internal dynamics. Fortunately, a rich 
body of modern social science literature offers tools to accomplish 
this very task. In the following sections, I develop an explanatory 
model that offers a richer alternative to the dominant, neoclassical 
economic paradigm. This alternative model draws primarily upon 
approaches utilized in the field of political economy. It also engages 
with other contemporary social science, spanning the fields of 
organizational theory, behavioral decision theory, and public choice 
economics, yielding an analytical framework that more properly 
accounts for institutional and political dynamics in commercial 
restructurings. The insights gained from this new explanatory model 
are particularly relevant to modern Chapter 11 reform efforts. 
 
 
innovation of the theory was to conceptualize the relationship between management and 
shareholders of a public company as one of contract—a ‘corporate contract’—in which joint 
wealth would be maximized as a result of atomistic market-mediated actions.” Michael 
Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 779–
80 (2006). 
 140. These principles are fully in evidence in the dichotomy between corporate acts that 
are “intra vires,” and therefore valid, versus those that are “ultra vires” and therefore invalid. In 
corporate law, the business judgment rule effectively serves as a presumption that a corporate 
act is lawful, absent a contrary showing. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004). 
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A. Background: Modern Political Economy 
The political economy theoretical framework strives to explain 
how political forces shape economic outcomes, as well as how 
economic forces shape political outcomes.141 Political economists 
explore the relationships between governance factors and policy 
outcomes, focusing on the activities of governmental units, business 
and political associations, and informal groups and coalitions.142 In 
recent decades, the field of political economy has been deeply 
influenced by scholarship in the areas of behavioral decision theory, 
organizational theory, and public choice economics.143 As a result, 
the field has become a powerful cross-disciplinary tool for exploring 
the mechanisms through which institutions and their stakeholders 
gain authority, dominance, and control to exert pressure and drive 
outcomes.144 
Professors Eric Posner 145  and David Skeel 146  have made 
prominent use of insights from political economy in their efforts to 
analyze the role of powerful pressure groups in the bankruptcy 
lawmaking process. Most recently, Professor Adam Levitin draws 
upon theories of political economy to consider the feasibility of a 
statutory scheme under which states could file for bankruptcy, and 
to propose a political theory of bankruptcy law more broadly.147 
 
 
 141. Political economy explores, inter alia, “how the wealthy and, in particular, how 
political decisions and interests influence the location of economic activities and the distribution 
of the costs and benefits of these activities,” as well as “the effect of markets and economic 
forces on the distribution of power and welfare among states and other political actors.” ROBERT 
GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10–11 (1987). 
 142. Supra note 23. 
 143. See, e.g., KEVIN A. CARSON, ORGANIZATION THEORY: A LIBERTARIAN PERSPECTIVE (2008) 
(exploring state intervention in corporate affairs, using a theoretical framework influenced by 
organizational theory); Thomas Palfrey, Experiments in Political Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (2006) (exploring decision theory and game theoretic models in political 
economy). 
 144. Political economy as a mode of analysis has been applied in a range of fields. See, e.g., 
Johan Arndt, The Political Economy Paradigm: Foundation for Theory Building in Marketing, 47 J. 
MARKETING 44 (1983) (applying political economy analyses to marketing theory). 
 145. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 47 (1997). 
 146. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497 (1998). 
 147. See generally Levitin, Bankrupt Politics, supra note 13. 
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However, beyond these works exploring the bankruptcy-
lawmaking process and restructurings of governmental entities, legal 
scholars have not yet applied these modern social science 
perspectives to critique Chapter 11. In the following section, I 
explore the methods of modern political economy, and develop an  
 
alternative model that more accurately explains commercial 
restructuring outcomes. 
B. A New Model for Exploring Commercial Bankruptcies Under Chapter 11 
This section advances a new explanatory model for examining 
situations of corporate financial distress, which draws upon political 
economy and related fields of social science to develop a clearer 
understanding of how Chapter 11 outcomes are negotiated by and 
among complex organizational actors.148 In particular, it encourages 
a more thorough analysis of the parties and interests that shape 
restructuring outcomes. The approach considers how parties to 
Chapter 11 cases gain control of organizational actors to promote 
restructuring outcomes that privilege the economic interests of some 
stakeholders while subordinating the rights of others. By 
encouraging a more nuanced analysis of commercial restructurings, 
it exposes the Efficiency Fallacy and demonstrates the limitations of 
market mechanisms in commercial restructurings. 
As a preliminary matter, the new explanatory model dismantles 
unitary actors, scrutinizing constituent interests within the “debtor,” 
“creditors,” or other aggregated actors. In this way, the model looks 
beyond conceptual barriers imposed by agency relationships to 
identify the true drivers of organizational decisions.149 Generally 
speaking, stakeholders of distressed firms seek to maximize their 
own profits or minimize their own losses, as the case may be. But in 
the context of complex commercial restructurings, stakeholders may 
have additional investments in, or relationships with, the debtor.150 
 
 148. This framework is based upon methodology set forth in JEFFRY FRIEDEN, DEBT, 
DEVELOPMENT & DEMOCRACY 16 (1991). 
 149. Of course, restructuring outcomes may be framed as beneficial to one group of 
constituents, when in fact they are intended to benefit a dominant pressure group. Political 
scientists observe similar dynamics in the lawmaking process. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. 
Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 512 (1991). 
 150. An expanded inquiry is necessary in light of modern financial engineering. For 
instance, where creditors hold credit default swaps, they have no incentive to consent to a 
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For instance, in the WorldCom restructuring,151 an SEC inquiry 
found that a creditor appointed to the creditors’ committee, in light 
of its $400 million claim, in fact hedged all but $6.5 million of this 
investment, and therefore did not possess an economic interest 
worthy of appointment to the committee over other creditors with 
far greater actual economic exposure.152 As this example suggests, 
stakeholders can have complex economic positions in relation to the 
Chapter 11 debtor, and such positions necessarily factor into the 
stakeholder’s ultimate preferences.153 
Furthermore, it is important to consider how stakeholders work 
together to influence restructuring outcomes. As Professor 
Gourevitch explains, “[t]he structures set up to manage policy are 
themselves important allocators of power.”154 Thus, “[d]ecisions 
about who is represented, how, and with what perquisites affect how 
policy is formed and implemented.”155 We cannot simply accept at 
face value the grouping mechanisms imposed by Chapter 11 or 
pursuant to the parties’ own private ordering, since certain 
stakeholders may take extraordinary predicate steps to capture 
control within these structures. For instance, whether within or 
outside of bankruptcy, parties at times make secret deals to buy 
votes from certain other constituents to meet consent thresholds.156 
Similarly, in Chapter 11, participants at times buy controlling 
interests in other securities of the debtor to gain the right to vote in 
plan confirmation proceedings on behalf of additional classes.157 In 
 
restructuring. Lubben, supra note 43, at 427–29. 
 151. In re WorldCom, Inc., No. 02-13533, 2002 WL 1732646 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 22, 
2002). 
 152. In re Greenfield, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 52744, at 8 (Nov. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-52744.pdf (remedial sanctions and cease-
and-desist order). 
 153. Broader appreciation of an actor’s interests is needed to overcome the assumptions 
addressed in Woo, supra note 20. In particular, Woo explains that profit maximization 
assumptions fail to take into consideration the need for financial institutions to comply with 
regulatory requirements. 
 154. GOUREVITCH, supra note 18, at 231. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP v. LifeCare Holdings Inc., 377 F. App’x. 422 
(5th Cir. 2010) (finding that a borrower offered to pay an increased fee to certain holdout 
lenders in exchange for consent to an out-of-court restructuring). 
 157. In re DBSD N. Am., Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 102 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that purchasing 
claims in bankruptcy “for the purpose of securing the approval or rejection of a plan does not of 
itself amount to ‘bad faith.’” Nor is it improper to buy a claim to obtain standing to file a 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014  1:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
788 
cases of this sort, attention must be given to these predicate 
measures, and to their effects on the overall efficiency of the 
restructuring process. As economist George Stigler observed in his 
work on public choice, when dominant interests are left unchecked, 
they strive to capture institutions so that they can extract rents.158 
In essence, a full appreciation of the social costs requires a richer 
picture of the strategic exchanges that take place beyond the 
bargaining table. 
Along these lines, collective action principles can be used to 
better understand how groups of stakeholders are able to influence 
restructuring outcomes. 159  These insights reveal that some 
stakeholders are better able to translate their individual profit 
maximization goals into restructuring outcomes, while other groups 
struggle with collective action problems.160 In particular, smaller and 
more concentrated groups that offer their members appreciable 
benefits do not typically suffer from a lack of cohesion, whereas large 
and highly dispersed groups are more susceptible.161 Similarly, as 
Professor David Skeel has explored,162 consent mechanisms, voting 
thresholds, and other institutional dynamics can and do impact the 
functionality of collective action in Chapter 11.163 Consistent with 
these theoretical models, scholarship by Professor Kelli Alces 
identifies the collective action problems confronted by equity 
security holders of large corporations. 164  The following section 
 
competing plan.); see also Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for 
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 191 
(exploring claims trading as a means of gaining influence over a bankruptcy process); Figter Ltd. 
v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of Am. (In re Figter Ltd.), 118 F.3d 635, 637 (9th Cir.1997) 
(creditors in one class arranged for a controlling voice in another class to control the 
restructuring outcome); In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 333 B.R. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same), 
rev’d, 600 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 158. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 
(1971). 
 159. Collective action principles are explored in OLSON, supra note 114; see also ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990). 
 160. OSTROM, supra note 159, at 29. 
 161. OLSON, supra note 114, at 48. 
 162. David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461 (1992). 
 163. The foundational social science work on consent mechanisms is JAMES M. BUCHANAN 
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY (1962). 
 164. Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717 (2010). 
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applies these insights to recent Chapter 11 cases in an effort to 
expose the limitations of the Efficiency Fallacy and develop a better 
understanding of Chapter 11 negotiations. 
IV. DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
As previous sections argue, the Efficiency Fallacy fails to 
consider how internal dynamics undercut the ability of market 
mechanisms to fairly and efficiently apportion rights. The following 
sections apply insights from political economy to explore the 
Chapter 11 cases of Washington Mutual Bank, previously one of the 
nation’s largest banking institutions, and General Growth Properties, 
a leading commercial real estate management company. In both 
cases, stakeholders disagreed with each other and with the debtors’ 
management on a number of critical issues, and these disagreements 
needed to be resolved during the course of the Chapter 11 case 
before the debtors could emerge from bankruptcy. The purpose of 
these case studies is to reveal possible distortionary effects of 
Chapter 11 that impair the efficiency of these negotiations and the 
fairness of the ultimate restructuring outcomes. The insights gained 
from this analysis are particularly useful in reassessing the normative 
foundations of the law of corporate financial distress and in 
proposing legal reforms. 
Before turning to the case studies, a few points should be made. 
Recall that under the early neoclassical economic model, negotiated 
outcomes are taken to be the efficient result of profit-maximizing 
choices by large organizational actors who are deemed capable of 
taking deliberate steps to advance their own interests. The structural 
privileges afforded to unitary actors (and, by extension, to their 
controlling stakeholders) are justified by a neoclassical belief that 
decisions made by organizational actors reflect the aggregated 
interests of constituents, and negotiations among such actors in a 
competitive market generate equilibrium. 165  Thus, negotiated 
outcomes are believed to reflect the underlying value of the debtors’ 
assets versus liabilities, which are assumed to be a function of 
demand in a competitive market.166 In this manner, the Efficiency 
Fallacy declares that negotiated outcomes are most advantageous for 
all constituents; if a better, more economically productive allocation 
 
 165. See supra Part II.B. 
 166. See supra Part II.A. 
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of the debtor’s assets were possible, the market clearinghouse 
functions within each organizational actor and the overall efficiency 
of the restructuring process would have enabled such other outcome 
to prevail. In other words, those able to make better use of the 
debtor’s resources would have been willing to pay more for them, 
yielding a different outcome. 
Yet the case studies reveal institutional dynamics that controvert 
these assumptions. Although the prevailing construct “impl[ies] 
coincidence of perceptions, control of choice, and coordination of 
movement” within each organizational actor,167 the case studies 
demonstrate that constituent groups are highly fractured, harboring 
deeply conflicting views regarding the underlying value of the 
debtor’s assets and the proper course for maximizing such value. 
Furthermore, certain organizational actors, such as the debtor, 
are especially subject to capture by dominant, self-interested factions 
or individuals. And, rather than relying on a true market 
clearinghouse function to resolve conflicts, powerful stakeholders are 
able to engage in strategic, opportunistic, and other anticompetitive 
conduct to obtain control, monopolize restructuring outcomes, and 
extract rents. As a result, certain persons tend to have greater power 
and privilege from the outset. Generally speaking, Washington 
Mutual’s restructuring outcome favored parties who obtained 
concentrated power and authority (such as the company’s corporate 
creditors), at the expense of other parties (such as equity security 
holders) who were too dispersed to gain meaningful influence. In 
contrast, General Growth’s restructuring favored certain equity 
security holders, who were able to gain concentrated power early in 
the process, at the expense of widely dispersed creditors. But the 
neoclassical paradigm declines to shed light upon these internal 
dynamics. Thus, not only does the legal construct produce a 
distortionary effect, it also shields these very distortions from view. 
These themes will be further dissected in subsequent sections. 
A. The Washington Mutual Chapter 11 Case 
The Washington Mutual Chapter 11 filing is unique in that it 
followed on the heels of the largest bank failure in United States 
history.168 Seattle-based Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WMI”)169 was a 
 
 167. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 246. 
 168. Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. 
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savings and loan holding company that wholly owned its banking 
subsidiary, Washington Mutual Bank, FA (“WMB”).170 
Originally founded in 1889 after the Great Seattle Fire,171 by 
2006 Washington Mutual was the largest thrift holding company in 
the United States172 and the eighth largest credit-card issuer.173 
Industry observers routinely referred to the banking behemoth as a 
leading U.S. financial institution.174 In 2006, WMI’s capital stock 
surged to record highs175 and by 2008 WMB was the seventh largest 
among all U.S. bank and thrift holding companies.176 
In the years immediately preceding its demise, Washington 
Mutual was particularly active in residential mortgage 
originations.177 After the United States housing market collapsed in 
2007, the value of securities tied to real estate mortgages 
tumbled.178 Washington Mutual suffered severe losses, particularly 
in its riskier subprime lending business.179 
In February 2008, in response to deterioration in Washington 
Mutual’s financial condition, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(“OTS”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A1. 
 169. ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., filed with the 
Washington Secretary of State on Aug. 17, 1994. 
 170. The banking subsidiary, Washington Mutual Bank, Henderson, Nevada, was 
organized as a federal savings association insured under 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a). See OFFICES OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK [hereinafter “INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT”], at 
Appendix 2. 
 171. George Erb, JPMorgan Should Donate Its WaMu Artifacts, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., June 14, 
2009. On the institution’s early history, see generally MURRAY MORGAN, THE FRIEND OF THE 
FAMILY: 100 YEARS WITH WASHINGTON MUTUAL (1989). 
 172. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 14, 2005). 
 173. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 14 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
 174. See, e.g., Robert O’Connor, That’s Affordable: Seattle-based Washington Mutual Has Built a 
Serious Business Around Community Outreach and Affordable Lending, MORTGAGE BANKING, July 31, 
2005, at 73 (referring to the “lending giant”). 
 175. Will Edwards, Washington Mutual Earnings Rise on Providian Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 
18, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMwatJskzJYE. 
 176. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 29, 2008). 
 177. Id. at 69 (“For the year ended December 31, 2007, proceeds from the sale of loans 
originated and held for sale were approximately $78.93 billion.”). 
 178. The subprime lending crisis, and Washington Mutual’s role in particular, are explored 
in KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011). 
 179. See id. 
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lowered the bank’s safety and soundness rating to a 3, on a scale of 1 
to 5, signaling it was a troubled institution.180 By late summer 2008, 
Washington Mutual estimated it could face $19 billion in losses over 
the next several years from underperforming and defaulting 
mortgage loans. 181  As investor confidence sank, the parent 
company’s stock price began to tumble.182 In mid-September 2008, a 
bank run drained the institution of more than $17 billion in deposits 
in an eight-day period.183 OTS and the FDIC lowered the bank’s 
safety and soundness rating once again, signaling that the bank could 
fail.184 
On September 25, 2008, WMB was seized by OTS.185 OTS 
appointed the FDIC as receiver, 186 and as such the FDIC “by 
operation of law, succeed[ed] to all rights, titles, powers, and 
privileges” of WMB, and of any “stockholder, member, 
accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution with 
respect to the institution and the assets of the institution . . . .”187 
In essence, under federal law the FDIC stepped into the shoes of 
WMB and WMI, to the extent WMI owned the outstanding stock of 
WMB, and, in that capacity, was entitled to “marshal[] assets of 
[the] failed institution[] for the benefit of its creditors.”188 
Washington Mutual’s failure threatened to deplete the FDIC’s 
$45 billion Deposit Insurance Fund. 189  Acting under its broad 
 
 180. Letter from OTS to Washington Mutual Bank (Feb. 28, 2008) (on file with author). 
 181. Washington Mutual, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at (July 22, 2008). 
 182. Eric Dash & Geraldine Fabrikant, Washington Mutual Stock Falls on Investor Fears, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2008, at C1. 
 183. Press Release, Senate Subcommittee Holds Second Hearing on Wall Street and the 
Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators, 1848 PLI/CORP 363, (Apr. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=9c58e384-4c2f-4151-bc2b-
0b21e5070b0b. 
 184. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 170, at 18. 
 185. OTS, Order Number 2008-36, Sept. 25, 2008. 
 186. Letter from OTS to WMB (Sept. 25, 2008) (notifying WSB of the FDIC’s appointment 
as receiver) (on file with author). 
 187. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 188. U.S. ex rel. RTC v. Schroeder, 86 F.3d 114, 117 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Courtney v. 
Halleran, No. 02-C-6926, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18795, at *11–12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2004) 
(“[W]hen the FDIC is appointed receiver of an insolvent bank, it essentially ‘steps into the 
shoes’ of that bank and assumes control of the bank’s rights and assets, including certain causes 
of action the bank might have against other parties.”). 
 189. Marcy Gordon, Federal Bank Insurance Fund Slips Below Target Level, USA TODAY (Sept. 
17, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-09-17-fdic-fund-
below-target-amount_N.htm; Linda Shen, WaMu’s Bank Split From Holding Company, Sparing 
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power, the FDIC determined that a sale of all of the assets, deposits, 
and other liabilities of WMB would be the best course. A sale of this 
sort was made feasible by Washington Mutual’s corporate structure. 
The company’s banking-related assets and liabilities were titled in 
the subsidiary, WMB, rather than in the parent company, WMI. In 
contrast, much of the corporate debt of Washington Mutual was in 
the name of the corporate parent, WMI. Similarly, Washington 
Mutual’s publicly-traded common and preferred equity security 
interests were issued by the parent company. However, 
notwithstanding the legal separateness of WMI and WMB, the two 
entities historically had identical and overlapping management and 
treated their assets and liabilities as “connected[,]. . .commingled 
and intertwined.”190 
Thus, on the same day as the bank seizure, the FDIC 
orchestrated the sale of substantially all of WMB’s assets to 
JPMorgan Chase Bank (“JPMorgan”), in exchange for JPMorgan 
paying WMI $1.88 billion in cash plus JPMorgan’s assumption of 
more than $145 billion in bank deposits, covered bonds and other 
secured liabilities of WMB. 191  Thanks to the sale transaction, 
WMB’s collapse “came at ‘zero cost’ to the insurance fund”192 in the 
form of payments from the deposit insurance fund.193 In the wake of 
the sale, JPMorgan disclosed that it realized nearly $12 billion from 
the transaction.194 
 
FDIC (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Sep. 26, 2008), 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a2VofC5midrw; see also Wall Street and 
the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) 
[hereinafter Wall Street Hearing]. 
 190. Complaint at 11–12, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Washington Mut., Inc., Bankr. 
No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 09-50551 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2009). 
 191. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & JPMorgan Chase Bank, Purchase and Assumption 
Agreement: Whole Bank (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_ 
Mutual_P_and_A.pdf [hereinafter Purchase Agreement]. 
 192. Shen, supra note 189. 
 193. However, the FDIC provided indemnification for claims based on the rights of any 
shareholders, creditors, officers, employees and depositors of Washington Mutual. See Purchase 
Agreement, supra note 191, at 25–26. The FDIC justified indemnification on the grounds that 
“such assistance is necessary to meet the obligations of the [FDIC] to provide insurance 
coverage for the insured deposits in [WMB],” and indemnification was the “least costly . . . 
method[] for meeting such obligation.” Id. at 1. Indemnification is permitted under 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823(c)(2)(A). 
 194. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 166 (Feb. 28, 2011). 
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The sale of WMB to JPMorgan was accomplished on an 
expedited basis in part because JPMorgan had been standing by as a 
ready and willing buyer. In fact, the New York-based banking giant 
made its first attempt to acquire WMB five months before the bank’s 
September 2008 failure.195 In March 2008, at the invitation of OTS 
and the FDIC, several prospective buyers of Washington Mutual 
reviewed the bank’s books and records.196 In April 2008, JPMorgan 
made a public offer to acquire Washington Mutual from WMI’s 
shareholders for $8 per share, payable in JPMorgan stock. 197 
Washington Mutual was able to resist this allegedly “low-ball 
bid”198 by obtaining a capital infusion from a private equity firm.199 
Although the infusion allowed the ailing bank to temporarily 
comply with banking capitalization requirements, regulatory 
pressure continued. In fact, Washington Mutual bondholders allege 
that in the months following JPMorgan’s April 2008 acquisition 
attempt, JPMorgan used and disclosed WMI’s confidential financial 
information to both pressure federal regulators to increase oversight 
of WMB and to harvest negative sentiments about WMI among 
rating agencies, media and investors.200 In particular, bondholders 
allege that JPMorgan engaged in a “lobbying effort to convince 
federal regulators to seize and sell off Washington Mutual’s assets at 
a fire-sale price that [JPMorgan] would be strategically positioned to 
take advantage of.”201 WMI echoed these accusations in its own 
lawsuit against the FDIC and also complained that the assets of 
WMB sold to JPMorgan, less the liabilities assumed, were worth 
substantially more than the $1.88 billion cash consideration received 
in the deal.202 
In the wake of the September 2008 acquisition, corporate parent 
WMI was stripped of its key operating subsidiary and business 
assets. Since JPMorgan did not assume Washington Mutual’s 
 
 195. Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 17, 18 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 196. Wall Street Hearing, supra note 189, at 57. 
 197. In TPG’s WaMu Deal, a New Playbook for Regulators?, DEALBOOK, Apr. 10, 2008, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/in-tpgs-wamu-deal-a-new-playbook-for-regulators/. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. These claims are made in Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d at 19. 
 201. Debtor’s Motion for an Order Directing the Production of Documents from 
Knowledgeable Parties at 6, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 14, 
2009), ECF No. 1997. 
 202. Complaint, Wash. Mut., Inc. v. F.D.I.C., No. 1:09-cv-00533 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2009). 
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corporate debts, WMI was rendered insolvent and filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection the next day in Delaware.203 In disclosures 
to the court, the company reported no secured liabilities, unsecured 
liabilities of approximately $8 billion, and assets of approximately 
$4.5 billion.204 Additionally, while not formally disclosed as an 
asset, WMI possessed approximately $20 billion dollars in 
consolidated net operating loss carryforwards, which could be 
preserved by Chapter 11 reorganization and used to offset future 
income. 205 Soon after the bankruptcy filing, WMI pursued civil 
claims against JPMorgan and the FDIC regarding the ownership of 
certain assets, including WMB’s share of these valuable tax 
attributes and $4 billion of trust securities.206 Extensive litigation 
ensued, both within and outside of bankruptcy court, among WMI 
and certain of its stakeholders, JPMorgan, the FDIC and certain of 
WMI’s largest creditors.207 
 
 203. Voluntary Petition of WMI Investment Corp., In re WMI Investment Corp., No. 08-
12228 (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1; Voluntary Petition of Washington Mutual, 
Inc., In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 26, 2008), ECF No. 1. The 
cases were consolidated pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) under Case No. 08-12229. 
 204. Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for WMI, at 10, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 
08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2008), ECF No. 477. 
 205. Interim Order Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (i) 
Establishing Notification Procedures and Approving Restriction on Certain Transfers of Interests 
in the Debtors’ Estates, and (ii) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-
12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 7, 2008), ECF No. 243. 
 206. The FDIC ordered that $4 billion of outstanding publicly-traded trust preferred 
securities issued by a special purpose entity of WMB be exchanged for preferred stock of WMI. 
The trust securities were then transferred to WMB, and sold to JPMorgan as part of the assets of 
WMB. This aspect of the acquisition is described in greater detail in Complaint, supra note 202 
at 10-11. 
 207. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 705 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(discussing Washington Mutual bondholders that alleged JPMorgan tortiously interfered with 
their contractual rights by engineering a campaign to distort market and regulatory perception of 
Washington Mutual’s financial health); Black Horse Capital LP, et al. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 10-51387 (Bankr. D. Del. July 6, 2010) (stating that 
Washington Mutual trust-preferred securities holders allege that WMI improperly converted 
their shares from debt to equity, and engaged in rampant fraud and misrepresentations with 
respect to these securities); Washington Mut., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00533 (stating that WMI alleges 
that the FDIC conducted the sale in an unlawful and unreasonable manner, and that the actions 
of the FDIC constituted an unlawful taking); Broadbill Investment Corp. v. Washington Mut., 
Inc., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 10-50911 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 12, 2010) (finding that 
holders of litigation tracking warrants relating to a $350 million judgment in favor of 
Washington Mutual claim that the funds should be awarded to them, while WMI claims that the 
warrants were converted to WMI common stock); Washington Mut., Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 09-50934 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (stating that WMI 
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In March 2010, WMI reached an agreement with JPMorgan, the 
FDIC, WMI’s largest creditors (referred to collectively as the 
“Settlement Noteholders”), and the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors to settle outstanding lawsuits, including an 
agreement to recognize JPMorgan as the owner of the $4 billion trust 
securities.208 As part of that settlement, JPMorgan would transfer to 
WMI approximately $4 billion in deposit funds, free and clear of all 
claims.209 Additionally, JPMorgan would relinquish its claims on 
approximately $2.5 billion in tax refunds relating to the banking 
business.210 Finally, WMI would grant releases to JPMorgan for all 
claims arising out of JPMorgan’s alleged misconduct. In total, the 
global settlement would enable the bankruptcy estate to distribute 
approximately $7.5 billion—an amount nearly sufficient to pay 
WMI’s creditors, but insufficient to provide any residual benefit to 
equity security holders.211 
The settlement agreement was a principal component of WMI’s 
sixth amended Chapter 11 plan, which was initially filed with the 
bankruptcy court in March 2010212 and subjected to a vote by all 
classes of WMI’s company’s creditors and equity security holders.213 
In some Chapter 11 cases, the debtor is able to put together a plan 
that all classes vote to accept. However, WMI was not such a case. 
Accordingly, WMI asked the court to confirm the sixth amended 
plan over the objections of dissenting classes. 214  Courts may 
exercise this power so long as certain technical requirements are 
met. Chief among these is a requirement that the plan is approved by 
at least one class of any claimants who are “impaired” under the 
 
alleges that JPMorgan failed to return over $4 billion in deposit liabilities that JPMorgan owes 
WMI); JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Washington Mut., Inc., Bankr. No. 08-12229, Adv. No. 
09-50551 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 24, 2009) (stating that JPMorgan alleges that the suit filed by 
WMI against JPMorgan places in jeopardy its economic interests in the assets it acquired in the 
sale). 
 208. See Section 2.3 of the Draft of Settlement Agreement, included as Exhibit I to the 
Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. 
Del. Mar. 26, 2010). 
 209. Id. at Section 2.1. 
 210. Id. at Section 2.4. 
 211. Letters to Creditors, et al. from WMI (Oct. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 212. Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 26, 2010). 
 213. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012). 
 214. The requirements are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(8). 
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plan.215 A class is considered to be impaired to the extent the plan 
changes the claimant’s legal, equitable and contractual rights.216 The 
impaired classes under the sixth amended plan included equity 
security holders and holders of PIERS Claims (a specific group of 
WMI’s unsecured creditors). 217  Equity security holders would 
receive no distributions, and PIERS claimants would recover 
approximately seventy-three percent of their claims.218 The PIERS 
claimants voted to accept the sixth amended plan, while equity 
security holders vehemently objected.219 
Despite the PIERS claimants’ satisfactory vote, the court was 
unable to confirm the sixth amended plan because of a host of 
disputes.220 In one such dispute, the Official Committee of Equity 
Security Holders (the “Equity Committee”) alleged that WMI 
allowed the Settlement Noteholders to dominate the restructuring 
process, steering WMI to settle claims in amounts sufficient to 
enable the bankruptcy estate to satisfy only creditor claims.221 In 
particular, the Equity Committee alleged that WMI did not 
adequately pursue claims against JPMorgan because the economic 
benefit of any damages awarded would accrue to WMI’s equity 
security holders rather than to the more powerful creditor groups.222 
Finally, the Equity Committee challenged the proposed members of 
 
 215. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10); In re Townco Realty Inc., 81 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1988). 
 216. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8); 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1). Under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), a 
debtor may under certain circumstances “cram down” a plan notwithstanding rejection by a 
creditor class. 
 217. The PIERS are Preferred Income Equity Redeemable Securities issued by Washington 
Mutual Capital Trust 2001 (“WMCT 2001”), a special purpose trust. The only assets of WMCT 
2001 are subordinated debentures issued by WMI. Thus, WMCT 2001 is a creditor of WMI, and 
WMCT 2001’s beneficial owners are treated as general unsecured creditors of WMI. See Post-
Hearing Brief of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., in its Capacity as Indenture Trustee and Guarantee 
Trustee, in Support of Confirmation, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. 
Aug. 10, 2011), ECF No. 8414. 
 218. Letters to Creditors, et al. from WMI (Oct. 19, 2010) (on file with author). 
 219. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 212–13 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
 220. In two successive opinions, the court concluded that the global settlement agreement 
was fair and reasonable, but declined to confirm the plan because of other deficiencies. In re 
Washington Mut., 461 B.R. 200; In re Washington Mut., Inc., 442 B.R. 314, 344–45, 365 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2011). 
 221. Objection of the Committee of Equity Security Holders to Confirmation of the 
Modified Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 
(Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2011), ECF No. 8192. 
 222. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 2/6/2014  1:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
798 
the WMI liquidating trust’s advisory board, claiming that members 
were appointed by constituencies that would receive a full or near-
full recovery and therefore could not be counted upon to pursue 
claims that would benefit other classes and constituencies.223 
However, one of the most heated disputes pertained to 
allegations initially raised by a thirty-three-year-old equity security 
holder, described by one journalist as a “day trading hipster.”224 The 
investor closely monitored the case and, in a rather unusual move, 
filed his own objection to the sixth amended plan, alleging that the 
plan was not proposed in good faith.225 Specifically, he claimed that 
WMI’s management breached duties of loyalty and care owed to 
equity security holders by “continually act[ing] adversely to equity, 
while simultaneously representing to the court . . . that equity’s 
interests are adequately represented”226 and by “work[ing] closely 
with the [Settlement Noteholders] to the exclusion . . . [and] 
detriment” of equity security holders.227 He further alleged that the 
plan confirmation votes of the Settlement Noteholders should be set 
aside because Settlement Noteholders did not vote on the plan in 
good faith228 and that, because of these alleged defects, the plan 
could not be confirmed by the court.229 
The investor also asserted that the Settlement Noteholders hold 
nearly seventy percent of the PIERS Claims and therefore 
strategically crafted an impaired class to affirm the plan.230 Finally, 
 
 223. See id. 
 224. Bess Levin, Day Trading Hipster Takes on David Tepper, DEALBREAKER (June 13, 2011), 
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/06/day-trading-hipster-takes-on-david-tepper/. 
 225. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, filed by Nate Thoma, In re Washington Mut., 
Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2010), ECF No. 6058. The objection alleges that the 
plan violates 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). 
 226. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225, at 1. 
 227. Id. at 2. 
 228. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e), “[o]n request of a party in interest . . . the court may 
designate any entity whose acceptance or rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not 
solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance with the provisions of this title.” In addition, 
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (d) provides that the vote of any entity designated by the bankruptcy court 
is to be excluded in assessing whether the requisite majorities for class acceptance have been 
achieved. 
 229. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225, at 4. 
 230. Id. The investor alleged that the Settlement Noteholders engaged in “class 
gerrymandering,” which has been a contentious issue in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Machne 
Menachem, Inc., 233 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that a plan will be rendered 
unconfirmable “by the impermissible gerrymandering of classes,” since “vote manipulation by 
the gerrymandering of classes seriously undermines the critical requirements set out in Section 
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he claimed that Settlement Noteholders traded extensively in debt 
securities of WMI throughout the pendency of the case, despite 
possession of material, non-public information obtained during 
negotiations.231 Based upon the allegations raised by the investor, 
the Equity Committee subsequently filed a motion to conduct an 
examination of the Settlement Noteholders.232 In February 2011, the 
Court granted the Equity Committee’s request, permitting a limited 
examination of the Settlement Noteholders.233 
The investor’s bold attempts to influence the proceedings were 
met with significant opposition. One of the Settlement Noteholders, 
a hedge fund that invests with a focus on distressed debt, served a 
reciprocal examination request upon the individual investor.234 The 
request for production, which was prepared by one of the nation’s 
largest commercial law firms and served upon the investor at his 
uncle’s apartment, demanded access to “[a]ll documents or 
communications concerning and/or reflecting communications 
between [the investor] and the Equity Committee . . . [and] any 
other person relating to [the] Objection and/or subsequent proffers 
to the Court” and “all documents and communications sufficient to 
reflect . . . past or present holdings in any securities of the 
Debtors.”235 When timely responses from the investor were not 
received, the hedge fund moved for an order compelling him to 
produce documents and respond to interrogatories.236 
 
1129(a)(8)”). 
 231. Objection to the Plan of Reorganization, supra note 225. 
 232. Motion of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders for an Order Pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the Examination of the 
Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2011), ECF No. 6567. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 authorizes examinations 
of this sort. 
 233. Order Granting, in Part, Motion of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders 
for an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the 
Examination of the Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders Group, In re Washington 
Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 2011), ECF No. 6725. 
 234. Objection of Appaloosa Management L.P. to the Motion of the Equity Committee for 
an Order Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2004-1 Directing the 
Examination of the Washington Mutual, Inc. Settlement Note Holders Group at 17, In re 
Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 6645. 
 235. Appaloosa Management L.P.’s First Request for Production of Documents to Nate 
Thoma at 4–5, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 8, 2011), ECF 
No. 6887. 
 236. Motion of Appaloosa Management L.P. for an Order Compelling Nate Thoma to 
Search for and Produce Documents and to Respond to Interrogatory Requests, In re Washington 
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Struggling to overcome substantial collective action obstacles, 
equity security holders from around the world rallied in the private 
investor’s defense. Approximately one hundred and eighty individual 
investors, mostly from Europe, flooded the court with objections to 
the hedge fund’s motion. 237  One such objection asserts that, 
pursuant to an “exceptionally questionable motion,” the hedge fund 
“intends to proceed against a small investor and examine him.”238 
The objection further argues that “instead of initiating a parallel, 
senseless examination of a small, private investor, the [Settlement 
Noteholders] should . . . provide the requested documents to the 
Equity Committee.” 239 Finally, at least one objection notes the 
hardship imposed by the hedge fund’s demands, given that the  
investor is not receiving reimbursement from the debtor’s estate of 
expenses and attorneys’ fees.240 
In July 2011, the Equity Committee filed an additional objection 
to the sixth amended plan, further asserting that Settlement 
Noteholders traded in WMI securities on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information and arguing that the Settlement Noteholders 
“hijacked” negotiations and controlled WMI during the bankruptcy 
process.241 In September 2011, after several hearings, the court 
refused to confirm the sixth amended plan, citing a number of 
defects.242 The court found that the equity security holders had a 
colorable claim of insider trading, and granted a motion authorizing 
 
Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 19, 2011), ECF No. 7160. 
 237. See In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del) (reflecting the 
objections on the docket). 
 238. Objection of Thomas Dresel to the Motion of Appaloosa Management L.P. (cf. Docket 
Number 7160) for an Order Compelling Mr. Nate Thoma to Search for and Produce Documents 
and to Respond to Interrogatory Requests and as Consequence of it [sic] Motion for (a) 
Allowance for Mr. Thoma of Reimbursement for all Costs in this Matter (b) Trading Restrictions 
for all Parties, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 27, 2011), ECF 
No. 7197. 
 239. Id. at 2. 
 240. Id. at 4. 
 241. Objection of the Official Committee of Equity Security Holders to Confirmation of the 
Modified Sixth Amended Plan of Reorganization, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 
(Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 1, 2011), ECF No. 8073. This is not the first time a claim of insider trading 
has been made in a bankruptcy case. For instance, a creditor was accused of trading on the basis 
of material, nonpublic information gained from its service on a committee in In re Galey & Lord, 
Ch. 7 Case No. 04-43098 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2004). 
 242. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 267 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
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the Equity Committee to pursue the claim.243 However, “concerned 
that the case [would] devolve into a litigation morass” and citing the 
potential economic futility of prosecuting the claim of insider  
trading, the court ordered the parties to engage in mediation to 
resolve lingering disputes.244 
In December 2011, the Debtors announced that the mediation 
had been successful and that a newly proposed seventh amended 
Chapter 11 plan contained a global settlement of all outstanding 
claims, including those of the equity security holders.245 Under the 
new plan, the Settlement Noteholders would contribute $75 million 
to the reorganized WMI.246 Holders of WMI’s common stock would 
receive their pro rata share of twenty-five percent of the equity of the 
new company, while holders of WMI’s preferred stock would receive 
their pro rata share of seventy-five percent of the new company.247 
The plan also included releases from the equity securities holders, 
J.P. Morgan, and the FDIC of all legal claims.248 The court confirmed 
the seventh amended plan in February 2012.249 
B. The General Growth Chapter 11 Case 
Originally formed in 1954 to operate a single retail property in 
Iowa, the Chicago-based retail mall owner General Growth 
Properties, Inc., a publicly-traded real estate investment trust, 
steadily grew to become one of the nation’s largest retail mall 
owners. 250  General Growth featured a multi-tiered corporate 
 
 243. Id. at 254–67. 
 244. Id. at 267. 
 245. Motion of Debtors for an Order, Pursuant to Sections 105, 502, 1125 and 1128 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 3003, 3017, 3018, 3019, 3020, and 9006, (I) 
Approving the Proposed Disclosure Statement and the Form and Manner of the Notice of the 
Proposed Disclosure Statement Hearing, (II) Establishing Solicitation and Voting Procedures, 
(III) Scheduling a Confirmation Hearing, and (IV) Establishing Notice and Objection Procedures 
for Confirmation of the Debtors’ Seventh Amended Plan, In re Washington Mut., Inc., No. 08-
12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 13, 2011), ECF No. 9181. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 2012 WL 1563880 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012); see also Peg 
Brickley, WaMu Bankruptcy Plan Advances, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577229153649046724.html. 
 250. Iliana Jonas & Emily Chasan, General Growth files historic real estate bankruptcy, REUTERS 
(April 16, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/16/us-generalgrowth-bankruptcy-
idUSLG52607220090416. 
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structure, with certain assets and liabilities titled in upper-level 
holding companies,251 and the balance of assets and liabilities titled 
in hundreds of bankruptcy remote “special-purpose entities” 
(“SPEs”). The parent company (“GGP”) was publicly-traded.252 
Across a complex corporate structure, the company held a large 
amount of debt secured primarily by commercial real estate. As real 
estate values plummeted in 2007 and 2008, the company’s debt-to-
asset ratios became a source for concern.253 As of December 31, 
2008, General Growth reported nearly $30 billion in assets and just 
over $27 billion in liabilities.254 At that time, approximately $25 
billion of General Growth’s liabilities pertained to debt 
instruments.255 Of this amount, approximately $18 billion consisted 
of mortgages on the SPEs’ property, and nearly $7 billion consisted 
of unsecured corporate-level debt.256 
In better economic times, the company managed cash flow by 
regularly obtaining mortgage loans secured by the SPEs’ properties, 
structured with medium-term maturities and balloon payments.257 
However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and recession, 
General Growth found it increasingly difficult to obtain mortgage 
loans with acceptable terms. When installment payments on its 
corporate debt and approximately $15 billion of mortgage loans 
came due in 2009,258 the company found itself in default of its 
obligations.259 Making matters worse, the company was unable to 
 
 251. GGP’s “corporate-level” debt is in fact held by a number of upper-tier holding 
companies. 
 252. Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., The Buck’s Rebound Begins Here, 
Presentation at Ira Sohn Conference, May 29, 2009. 
 253. General Growth’s business suffered from the bursting of the real estate bubble and 
the subsequent global recession. See supra note 178, and source cited therein. 
 254. General Growth Properties, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2008). 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 258. See Kris Hudson, General Growth Switches Its Bankruptcy Counsel, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 5, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123111371319952447.html (detailing the company’s 
struggles); Kelly Johnson, General Growth Reports $1.2B in Overdue Debt, PAC. BUS. NEWS (Feb. 24, 
2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2009/02/23/daily26.html?page=all. 
 259. Iliana Jonas, General Growth Says Has Defaulted on Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/02/21/generalgrowth-idINN2050986920090221?rpc=44 
(describing the termination of a forbearance agreement and the resultant cross-default of 
corporate debt). 
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refinance or sell assets to generate cash flow.260 
In what would later be dubbed “one of the biggest commercial 
real estate collapses in United States history,”261 General Growth 
commenced its restructuring process via protracted, out-of-court 
negotiations. GGP and its corporate-level lenders spent seven 
months trying to reach a deal.262 When lenders refused to consent to 
GGP’s proposed out-of-court restructuring, 263  the company and 
hundreds of its project-level affiliates filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in waves commencing in April 2009.264 
The decision to file for bankruptcy was strongly encouraged by a 
new, dominant stakeholder in GGP. In the months leading up to the 
bankruptcy filing, a hedge fund known for taking activist positions in 
distressed companies acquired interests amounting to nearly 25% of 
legal and beneficial ownership of GGP, including the largest (7.5%) 
stake in the company’s publicly-traded equity security interests. The 
hedge fund also held approximately $225 million of GGP’s 
corporate-level debt, $177 million of which was acquired for 
approximately thirty cents on the dollar.265 
Additionally, in contemplation of the bankruptcy filing, the 
hedge fund sought to become GGP’s debtor-in-possession financing 
lender,266 and received a $15 million payment for its commitment to 
 
 260. David Roeder, Mall Owner Mauled by Debt, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009. 
 261. Michael J. de la Merced, General Growth Properties Files for Bankruptcy, DEALBOOK (Apr. 
16, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/general-growth-properties-files-for-
bankruptcy/. 
 262. Daniel Taub & Brian Louis, General Growth Files Biggest U.S. Property Bankruptcy, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
anaZwxRpYcTw. 
 263. Ilaina Jonas, General Growth Fails to Win Bondholder Support, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2009), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/03/30/us-generalgrowth-idINTRE52T4FV20090330. 
 264. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition of General Growth Properties, Inc., In re Gen. Growth 
Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 1. Pursuant to FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1015(b), the cases were consolidated for procedural purposes under Case No. 09-
11977. 
 265. Dan Wilchins, Ackman Bets General Growth is Fundamentally Healthy, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/16/us-generalgrowth-ackman-interview-sb-
idUSTRE53F7EH20090416. 
 266. The prospective debtor-in-possession financing arrangement was announced by GGP 
on the same day that it announced its bankruptcy filing, thereby strongly suggesting that the 
debtor and the hedge fund had been working together to develop the debtor’s Chapter 11 
strategy. See Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties, Inc. Files 
for Chapter 11 Protection; Broken Credit Markets Require GGP to Reduce and Restructure Debt (Apr. 16, 
2009), available at http://investor.ggp.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=377629. 
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lend $375 million to the company on terms that included interest at 
a rate equal to LIBOR plus 12% and warrants to buy 4.9% of a 
reorganized GGP.267 These expensive loan terms do not necessarily 
reflect the risk of default; with court approval, debtor-in-possession 
financing arrangements receive a priming lien that effectively 
ensures repayment.268 
However, just before the hearing to consider the proposal, the 
debtor entertained additional financing proposals from other related 
parties.269 At the hearing, the hedge fund, through its attorney, 
pushed to obtain the financing deal: “We made dramatic concessions 
to get to where we are today . . . . We expect the debtors to live by 
the rules.”270 Notwithstanding these efforts, the court ultimately 
approved a financing deal from a group of lenders that included 
certain of GGP’s unsecured creditors.271 The approved debtor-in-
possession financing contained substantially similar terms, except 
that the lenders would not receive stock warrants.272 
Following the loss of the financing deal, the hedge fund’s 
manager began lobbying for a position on the company’s board of 
directors,273 and was elected to the board in late May 2009.274 The 
hedge fund also lobbied on the company’s behalf on Wall Street. In 
presentations to investors and Wall Street analysts, the fund’s 
manager asserted that GGP’s publicly-traded common stock was 
worth substantially more than its trading range.275 In the May 2009 
 
 267. Ilaina Jonas, U.S. Judge OKs Bankruptcy Loan for General Growth, REUTERS (May 13, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/13/generalgrowth-idUSN1343594820090513. 
 268. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (2012). 
 269. Helen Chernikoff, General Growth Bankruptcy Financing Hearing Delayed, ALIBABA.COM 
(May 10, 2009), http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/markets/100099552-1-update-2-general-
growth-bankruptcy-financing.html 
 270. Id. 
 271. Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties, Inc. 
Announces Court Approval of DIP Financing (May 13, 2009), available at 
http://investor.ggp.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=383933. 
 272. Kris Hudson, General Growth Returns to Farallon for Bankruptcy Financing, WALL ST. J. 
(May 13, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124215538672711783.html. 
 273. See, e.g., Ackman Expects to Join General Growth Board, DEALBOOK (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/ackman-expects-to-join-general-growth-board/; 
Zachery Kouwe, A Hedge Fund Manager Wins and Moves On, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/business/economy/17ackman.html. 
 274. Nick Zieminski, Bill Ackman Appointed to General Growth Board, REUTERS (Jun. 8, 
2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/08/generalgrowth-ackman-idUSN08305700 
20090608. 
 275. Daniel Taub, General Growth Bidding War Looms After Simon Offer, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
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presentation, the manager argued that conditions were ripe for 
substantial growth in the value of equity security interests during 
the pendency of, and immediately following, the Chapter 11 
reorganization. 276  Among the many factors supporting this 
assertion, the fund’s manager noted the fund’s dual status as a 
director and investor, characterizing its role as that of a “shareholder 
advocate.”277 
It was perhaps the advocacy of this dominant shareholder that 
enabled the company to advance an aggressive restructuring plan 
that turned upon a creative exercise of contract interpretation.278 
The company’s hundreds of SPEs were, by definition, originally 
structured as bankruptcy remote. These SPEs had been created to 
own individual commercial real estate properties in the company’s 
portfolio, most of which secured mortgage loans.279 Since many of 
these mortgage loans were sold to third-party investors in the form 
of commercial mortgage-backed securities, ratings firms required 
that each SPE contractually promise (in its governing documents as 
well as in corresponding debt instruments) to limit operations in 
ways that would make the likelihood of bankruptcy remote.280 
In particular, the governing documents of the SPEs required 
unanimous consent of each SPE’s managers, including two 
independent managers, before the SPE could ever file for 
bankruptcy. 281  The independent managers were required to 
“consider only the interests of the Company, including its respective 
creditors, in acting or otherwise voting on” a bankruptcy filing.282 
Finally, most of the agreements provided that the independent 
managers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty and care similar to that of a 
 
17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMGHfJgIIeRI. 
 276. Pershing Square Conference Presentation, supra note 252, at 26–30. 
 277. Id. at 30. 
 278. Press Release, AlixPartners, AlixPartners Honored by the Turnaround Management 
Association for its Work at General Growth Properties and Neff Rental (Oct. 10, 2011) (“[A] strategy 
of sequencing negotiations was . . . employed to establish certainty around [GGP’s] ability to 
reorganize and retain properties with acceptable financing terms on a bottom-up basis within 
the organizational structure.”). 
 279. Amended Brief of Amici Curiae with Respect to the Filing of Voluntary Petitions in 
Bankruptcy by the Individual Property Owner Subsidiaries, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 
09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009), ECF No. 289. 
 280. Id. at 7 (describing the “twin components of asset isolation”). 
 281. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 282. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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director of a corporation organized under Delaware law.283 
Just prior to the General Growth bankruptcy filing, 
approximately 159 of the independent managers were terminated 
from the boards of their respective SPEs, and new independent 
managers were appointed. 284  The newly appointed independent 
managers consented to the SPE bankruptcy filings; in many cases, 
the former independent managers were not even aware of their 
termination until after the bankruptcy filing.285 
Not surprisingly, the SPEs’ bankruptcy petitions were met with 
strong objections from their mortgage lenders.286 These secured 
creditors filed motions to dismiss the SPEs’ bankruptcy cases, 
arguing that the SPEs were not financially distressed and had filed 
for bankruptcy solely to benefit GGP in a manner detrimental to the 
SPEs’ mortgage lenders.287 Attempting to assist the SPEs’ secured 
creditors via an amicus brief, an attorney representing the 
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association characterized the SPE 
bankruptcies as “GGP’s attempt to ignore organizational 
formalities.”288 
However, the bankruptcy court approved the SPEs’ Chapter 11 
petitions, finding that the secured creditors had not demonstrated 
objective futility of the filings.289 Specifically, the court rejected the 
secured creditors’ argument that the question of whether a filing is 
made in good faith should be viewed only from each individual 
debtor’s perspective.290 Instead, the court looked to the interests of 
the enterprise as a whole, finding that a subsidiary may be included 
in the bankruptcy of its parent regardless of the financial health of 
 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 67–68. 
 285. See id. 
 286. Mark S. Edelstein, et. al., Bad Boy Guaranty Update: Lenders on a Winning Streak, in Real 
Estate Weekly (Mar. 3, 2010), at 285–86 (PLI Negotiating Real Estate Deals, Course Handbook 
Ser. No. N-591, 2011) (exploring bankruptcy remote entities as credit enhancements). 
 287. See, e.g., Motion of ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1112(b), to Dismiss the Cases of Bakersfield Mall, LLC, RASCCAP Realty, Ltd.; Visalia Mall, 
L.P.; GGP-Tucson Mall L.L.C.; Lancaster Trust; HO Retail Properties II Limited Partnership; RS 
Properties Inc.; Stonestown Shopping Center L.P.; and Fashion Place, LLC, Amended Brief of 
Amici Curiae with Respect to the Filing of Voluntary Petitions in Bankruptcy by the Individual 
Property Owner Subsidiaries, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 
4, 2009), ECF No. 334. 
 288. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 279, at 19. 
 289. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. 43, 65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 290. Id. at 69–70. 
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the subsidiary.291 
What is more, with respect to the SPEs’ independent managers, 
the court found that the termination, while “admittedly 
surreptitious,” was not indicative of subjective bad faith on the part 
of the debtors sufficient to require dismissal of the bankruptcy 
cases. 292  The court applied the reasoning of Delaware cases, 
asserting that directors of a solvent corporation owe their fiduciary 
duties to the corporation and its shareholders. 293  Thus, the 
independent managers could lawfully approve the bankruptcy filings 
notwithstanding the entities’ bankruptcy remote status, since the 
decision to file for bankruptcy was made at a time when each SPE 
was a solvent corporation and the decision was in the best interests 
of GGP as shareholder.294 
Finally, GGP requested authorization to use rents collected from 
the SPEs’ mall tenants.295 Although these rents constituted the 
secured creditors’ cash collateral,296 GGP argued that access to this 
cash flow was necessary to enable the company to continue its 
business operations.297 The SPE lenders objected, claiming that it 
would violate principles of legal separateness for GGP to “upstream 
cash from the individual properties for use at the parent-level 
entity.”298 In granting GGP’s request to use the cash, the court ruled 
that the company may upstream cash “at a time it was needed most 
by the Group,” and that the SPE lenders would receive adequate 
protection in exchange for permitting GGP to use the cash 
 
 291. See id. 
 292. Id. at 68. 
 293. Id. at 64–65. 
 294. Id. 
 295. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 55; see also Debtors’ Motion for Interim and Final 
Orders Pursuant to Sections 105(a), 363(b), 363(c) and 364(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rules 6003 and 6004 (a) for Authorization to (I) Continue Using Existing 
Centralized Cash Management System (II) Honor Certain Prepetition Obligations Related to the 
Use of the Cash Management System, and (III) Maintain Existing Bank Accounts and Business 
Forms; (B) for An Extension of Time to Comply with Section 345(b) of the Bankruptcy Code; 
and (C) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009), ECF No. 8.  
 296. Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(a), “cash collateral” includes cash, cash equivalents, proceeds 
and accounts receivable. A debtor is prohibited from using cash collateral without a secured 
lender’s consent or a court order authorizing the debtor’s use. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012). 
 297. See supra note 295 and sources cited therein. 
 298. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R. at 55. 
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collateral.299 
 
With the SPEs safely in bankruptcy and GGP authorized to use 
the SPEs’ rental income, SPE creditors were highly incentivized to 
agree to a restructuring of the mortgage loans. By February 2010, 
General Growth completed negotiations with 231 of the SPE 
creditors.300  In most cases, the restructuring entailed a modification 
of loan terms, including extension of the maturity date.301 
As General Growth’s SPE-level debt burdens were gradually 
alleviated via the SPE restructurings, focus shifted to restructuring 
GGP’s corporate-level debt and planning the parent company’s 
reemergence from bankruptcy. To this end, the company explored 
strategic opportunities, such as a sale of the entire company.302 
General Growth received an unsolicited acquisition offer from its 
competitor, retail mall operator Simon Property Group 
(“Simon”).303 Pursuant to the offer, all corporate-level creditors 
would be paid in full and equity security holders would receive 
approximately $9 per share.304 GGP rejected the offer, citing a desire 
to explore all strategic options.305 In the days following Simon’s bid, 
 
 299. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), (e). 
 300. General Growth Properties, Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 1, 2010). 
 301. See, e.g., Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties 
Announces Bankruptcy Court Confirmation of Plans of Reorganization for Approximately 
$10.25 Billion of Secured Mortgage Loans (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.ggp.com/about-ggp/press-releases/general-growth-properties-announces-
bankruptcy-court-confirmation-of-plans-of-reorganization-for; Press Release, General Growth 
Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties Reaches Agreement in Principle on Certain 
Mortgage Related Debt (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://investor.ggp.com/ 
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=425484. 
 302. See Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties 
Announces Next Steps in Restructuring Process (Dec. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20091217005359/en/General-Growth-Properties-
Announces-Steps-Restructuring-Process (“[T]he Board of Directors and management are 
considering all indications of interest in the Company.”). 
 303. Michael J. de la Merced, With Big Takeover Bid, Simon Aims to Control 30% of U.S. Malls, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/business/17mall.html; see 
also Press Release, General Growth Properties, Inc., General Growth Properties Responds To 
Simon Property Group and Reaffirms Bankruptcy Emergence Process (Feb. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100216007615/en/General-Growth-Properties-
Responds-Simon-Property-Group. 
 304. Taub, supra note 275. 
 305. Press Release, supra note 303 (quoting GGP’s letter to Simon: “We and our board of 
directors have given considerable thought to your indication of interest and have concluded 
based on discussions with other interested parties that it is not sufficient to preempt the process 
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GGP’s stock price soared.306 Wall Street analysts reiterated positive 
ratings on the bankrupt company, citing a belief that “management 
will do what maximizes the value for its shareholders.”307 
In the months that followed, Simon revised its bid and lobbied 
for support among GGP’s stakeholders. 308  GGP’s unsecured 
creditors backed the proposal, alleging that the General Growth 
restructuring was mired by conflicts of interest caused by the hedge 
fund’s position as a director of the company, a dominant creditor, 
and its largest equity security holder.309 In a motion filed in the 
bankruptcy court, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
(the “Unsecured Creditors Committee”) expressed its concern that 
the debtors were “attempting to . . . force upon their creditors a 
lengthy and uncertain Capital Raise/M&A Process, rather than 
pursue a transaction that would guarantee . . . creditors . . . cash 
payment in full and provide . . . equity holders with a substantial 
distribution.”310 What is more, the Unsecured Creditors Committee 
accused the debtors of “ignoring their fiduciary duty to creditors 
by . . . pursu[ing] a Capital Raise/M&A Process designed solely to 
benefit equity holders at great risk to creditors’ recoveries.”311 The 
Unsecured Creditors Committee expressed a preference for the 
Simon offer because it would provide a timely and more certain cash 
recovery; in contrast, the pursuit of other strategic alternatives 
would bring delays, risks, uncertainty and substantial transaction 
costs.312 In addition, the Unsecured Creditors Committee accused 
 
we are undertaking to explore all avenues to emerge from Chapter 11 and maximize value for all 
the Company’s stakeholders.”). 
 306. Kris Hudson, Simon Offers $10 Billion for General Growth, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804204575069081644845898.html 
(“Investors expect a sweetened bid from either Simon or from any competing plan General 
Growth offers for its exit from bankruptcy. On Tuesday they pushed General Growth’s stock up 
$2.62 to $12.02—more than $3 above the offer price—in 4 p.m. trading on the so-called Pink 
Sheets electronic trading system.”). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Barton Eckert, Simon Property Enhances Bid for General Growth Properties, WASH. BUS. J. 
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/stories/2010/04/19/daily81.html. 
 309. See infra note 310 and source cited therein. 
 310. Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors’ Motion 
Pursuant to Section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code Requesting a Second Extension of 
Exclusive Periods for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Solicitation of Acceptances Thereto at 2, In re 
Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010), ECF No. 4486. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 4–6. 
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the debtors of attempting to “inflate value for their equity holders” 
by raising, through strategic alternatives, “only the minimum 
amount of capital needed to achieve . . . emergence from chapter 
11 and to equitize large portions of [corporate level] unsecured debt 
at an artificially high equity value.”313 
In essence, the Unsecured Creditors Committee accused the 
company’s dominant equity security holders—and in particular, the 
hedge fund—of controlling General Growth’s bankruptcy and 
engaging in dilatory measures in the hopes of benefiting equity at 
the potential expense of creditors.314 Indeed, neither GGP nor the 
hedge fund ever expressly denied delaying the company’s exit from 
bankruptcy; for instance, in its motion for an extension, GGP noted 
that it could not yet file a Chapter 11 plan because it needed to give 
“the marketplace . . . an opportunity to fairly value General 
Growth’s enterprise.”315 
In May 2010, Simon made a “last-ditch offer” valued at 
approximately $20 per share. 316  GGP avoided Simon’s bid by 
entering into a stalking horse arrangement for approximately $10.50 
per share, also granting Pershing Square and several other investors 
warrants worth approximately $688 million to acquire stock in the 
reorganized company in exchange for financing.317 In October 2010, 
GGP advanced a Chapter 11 plan that was accepted by majorities in 
all classes entitled to vote. Under the plan, all creditor claims would 
be satisfied, equity security holders would receive approximately $15 
per share, and the company would be recapitalized pursuant to an 
equity infusion of $7 to $8.5 billion.318 In accordance with the plan, 
GGP exited bankruptcy in November 2010 and followed through 
with a proposed split of the company into two separate, publicly- 
 
 313. Id. at 5. 
 314. Id. at 20–21. 
 315. Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Section 1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code Requesting a 
Second Extension of Exclusive Periods for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Soliciting Acceptances 
Thereto at 2, In re Gen. Growth Props. Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010), ECF 
No. 4296. 
 316. Robert Carr, Court Agreement Ends GGP Bankruptcy Bid Battle, AMLAW DAILY (May 7, 
2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202457889043&Court_Agreement_Ends_ 
General_Growth_Bankruptcy_Bid_Battle. 
 317. Tiffany Kary & Daniel Taub, General Growth Wins Court Approval of Brookfield-Led Bid 
Over Simon Offer, BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-
07/general-growth-wins-court-approval-of-brookfield-led-bid-over-simon-offer.html. 
 318. Press Release, supra note 278. 
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traded companies. 319  The hedge fund’s manager was appointed 
chairman of one of the spinoff companies.320 
C. Insights Gained from the New Explanatory Model 
A central claim of this Article is that a broader explanatory 
model, drawing on the analytical tools of modern political economy, 
allows thicker narratives of Chapter 11 negotiations. Examining the 
two case studies under this alternative framework, it appears that 
the outcomes of Chapter 11 cases are very much driven by internal 
dynamics. These dynamics, which take place beyond the myopic view 
of the unitary actor model, undercut the persistent claim that 
negotiated Chapter 11 outcomes yield fair and efficient resolutions 
of corporate financial distress. And as the current bankruptcy 
process relies on such an Efficiency Fallacy, our judicial approach to 
Chapter 11 stands in stark need of reform. 
As a preliminary matter, the case studies reveal some 
shortcomings of neoclassical economic theory as a foundation of 
commercial bankruptcy law. In particular, the model’s persistent 
unitary actor construct is inadequate when applied to complex 
organizations. For instance, in the Washington Mutual restructuring, 
it is misleading to conceptualize the debtor as the same deliberate, 
rational actor that previously led a successful business enterprise. 
Prior to the FDIC’s sale of the bank to JPMorgan, Washington 
Mutual was a family of business entities with an extensive 
infrastructure to oversee a large banking and investment business.321 
In contrast, during the Chapter 11 case, Washington Mutual was a 
decimated corporate shell, with negotiations largely handled on its 
 
 319. A new company was formed to own indirectly substantially all of the equity of 
reorganized GGP. Another new company, The Howard Hughes Corporation, was formed to hold 
a portfolio of developing properties. Id. at 2; see also Daniel J. Sernovitz, Park Meadows Owner 
General Growth Properties Exits Bankruptcy, DENVER BUS. J. (Nov. 10, 2010, 7:09 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2010/11/10/general-growth.html. 
 320. Adam Castiglioni, Faneuil Hall Operator Out of Ch. 11, BOSTON HERALD (Nov. 10, 
2010), http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view.bg?articleid=1295271. 
 321. Washington Mutual, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 176, at 1. 
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behalf by dominant creditors. Similar recognition must be made as to 
purportedly unitary classes of “creditors” and “equity security 
holders.” For instance, in the WMI restructuring, the Settlement 
Noteholders assumed a dominant position among “creditors”;  
likewise, in the GGP restructuring, a hedge fund assumed a 
dominant position among “equity security holders.” 
Having identified some of the individuals and pressure groups 
driving collective action in the two case studies, the new explanatory 
model next invites us to identify the economic decision-making 
preferences of such persons. In the WMI restructuring, dominant 
creditors clearly sought full satisfaction of their claims. At a 
minimum, full satisfaction would make the creditors whole. 
However, to the extent individual creditors purchased their claims 
on the secondary market for less than face value, full satisfaction 
would enable them to profit from the restructuring. In contrast, in 
their secondary role as PIERS claimants, the dominant creditors did 
not desire full satisfaction of claims, but rather sought some degree 
of impairment sufficient to meet statutory requirements for plan 
approval. 322  What is more, it is important to note that these 
dominant creditors had no economic incentive to advance a 
restructuring outcome that would increase the bankruptcy estate 
beyond the face value of all unimpaired creditor claims—particularly 
if such an outcome would require protracted litigation, delays, and 
uncertainties. 
In contrast, in the General Growth restructuring, a hedge fund 
that specialized in distressed company investing sought to take 
advantage of the full upside potential of its equity security 
investments. In an effort to obtain formal authority to act on behalf 
of the debtor, the fund’s manager increased its equity share, sought 
and obtained a seat on the board of directors, and attempted to 
become the company’s debtor-in-possession lender. The hedge 
fund’s desire to realize GGP’s full upside potential steered the 
restructuring away from the more immediate Simon offer, towards 
less certain outcomes that had the potential to generate higher long-
term profits. Although the fund’s profit maximization goals were to 
some extent correlated with the profit maximization goals of other 
 
 322. Of course, given that the dominant creditors allegedly acquired PIERS claims on the 
secondary market, it is possible that they would achieve a profit even from partial satisfaction of 
the face value. 
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equity security holders, the fund’s investments in the debtor also 
included substantial debt positions, a position on the board of 
directors, a prospective position as the debtor-in-possession lender, 
and a prospective position as a large stakeholder in a post-
bankruptcy spinoff company. Thus, while the ultimate restructuring 
outcome may have been beneficial to all equity security holders, it 
also included components that would only benefit certain equity 
security holders. 
As collective action principles suggest, organizational actors that 
represent more concentrated constituents and operate with clear 
authority can be expected to take more decisive steps in 
restructurings. Thus, the FDIC, acting under a statutory grant of 
complete authority, was able to rapidly coordinate the sale of WMB 
to JPMorgan to avoid depletion of its Deposit Insurance Fund.323 
The FDIC accomplished this task without the need to negotiate with 
Washington Mutual’s stakeholders and without reference to “an 
idealized value . . . that . . . would arise if a perfect market were 
at work.”324 Indeed, there appear to have been minimal market 
checks on the sale. Similarly, the Settlement Noteholders were able 
to rise to a position of dominance in the Washington Mutual 
restructuring because they were similarly situated hedge funds 
holding large shares of corporate-level debts. In contrast, WMI’s 
equity security holders were widely dispersed, and although they 
eventually mobilized, their coalition-building process was much 
slower and required bold action and even personal exposure to reach 
the level of influence that other persons enjoyed from the very 
beginning. 
Having identified the profit maximization goals of these 
dominant individuals and pressure groups, we can better understand 
the effect of these interests on the Chapter 11 case outcomes. In the 
Washington Mutual restructuring, the Settlement Noteholders 
sought to advance their own profit maximization goals related to 
debt and equity investments made immediately before and during 
WMI’s bankruptcy. After a lengthy battle, the Settlement 
Noteholders offered a modest settlement to equity security holders 
in an effort to obtain their buy-in to the Chapter 11 plan. Similarly, 
in the General Growth restructuring, a hedge fund with a dominant 
 
 323. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 324. Roe, supra note 34, at 530. 
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equity stake pushed to obtain a restructuring outcome that secured 
maximum returns on equity investments. 
The new explanatory model also allows us to more readily 
identify potential economic rents. In the Washington Mutual 
restructuring, dominant creditors allegedly used information 
asymmetries to profit from insider trading in the debtor’s securities, 
extracting economic rents from other, less knowledgeable traders in 
the securities market. Similarly, in the General Growth 
restructuring, dominant equity security holders arguably extracted 
economic rents from other constituents in the form of additional  
equity conversions as well as a large commitment fee for debtor-in-
possession financing.325 
In essence, the new explanatory model offers a different account 
of negotiated outcomes in Chapter 11, which stands in contrast to 
the account provided by neoclassical economic theory. Consistent 
with the early criticisms of Chapter 11, rather than reflecting the 
price equilibrium of a competitive market, outcomes continue to 
reflect the successful occupation of large organizational actors by 
certain dominant individuals and pressure groups, who seek to 
advance their own profit maximization goals.326 
What is more, it appears from the case studies that when these 
individuals and pressure groups obtain control of large 
organizational actors, they do not in fact rely upon negotiation to 
reach restructuring outcomes. Somewhat counter intuitively, it 
appears that dominant interests strategically use Chapter 11 to 
overturn the customary commercial expectations of less powerful 
parties. For instance, in the Washington Mutual restructuring, rather 
than seek to negotiate with equity security holders, dominant 
creditors initially sought to utilize the legal process to discourage 
and stifle their efforts. Similar challenges were faced by General 
Growth’s mortgage lenders, whose claims were dispersed across 
hundreds of SPE entities; indeed, dominant equity security holders 
successfully used Chapter 11 to interfere with the SPE lenders’ 
 
 325. And, as hinted by strong advocacy efforts to obtain the debtor-in-possession financing 
deal, these dominant interests also sought rents in the form of high rates of interest and 
additional loan fees—common features of debtor-in-possession financings arranged by insiders. 
 326. Themes of this sort are explored empirically in Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. 
Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511 (2009) 
(examining data on 153 large companies’ Chapter 11 cases to show that creditors largely control 
Chapter 11 restructurings and that such control distorts the efficiency of case outcomes). 
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customary commercial expectations with respect to SPE covenants 
they previously agreed upon in routine mortgage securitization 
transactions. Taken together, these observations not only reaffirm 
the early criticisms of Chapter 11, but also reveal new insights about 
commercial restructurings that were previously omitted from the 
narratives that shape law and policy. For one thing, the case studies 
suggest that the Chapter 11 process favors powerful actors,327 such 
as hedge funds acting under streamlined management by charismatic  
leaders, and governmental agencies operating under strong statutory 
grants of power. 
And, most provocatively, the case studies suggest that against 
this backdrop, market mechanisms are used by those with existing 
“market power”328 in the securities and capital markets to gain a 
considerable advantage in negotiations. Specifically, these actors use 
their existing market power to take extraordinary predicate measures 
to enhance their bargaining power or gain increased control over 
restructuring outcomes. For instance, such persons may strategically 
acquire additional interests in (or claims against) the debtor via the 
debt and securities markets, or exert pressure to gain managerial 
control over the debtor to steer prospective financing or acquisition 
deals.329 
Even more damning to the Efficiency Fallacy and the modern 
faith in market mechanisms, the case studies suggest that actors are 
able to utilize market power to engage in opportunistic and 
 
 327. Such parties are reminiscent of the cartels that are the focus of antitrust law. 
 328. Market power is the ability of a market participant to alter market prices—typically 
above competitive levels. In a perfectly competitive market, no participant has this power. 
Participants gain market power by controlling a dominant share of the market. For instance, in a 
monopoly, a single participant controls the entire market and thus enjoys market power. 
Similarly, participants in a highly concentrated market may enjoy market power where there are 
significant barriers to entry for prospective competitors. See Massimiliano Vatiero, An 
Institutionalist Explanation of Market Dominances, 32 L. & ECON. REV. 221 (2009). 
 329. See generally Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications 
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 703 (2008). For examples of these 
phenomena, see Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Names Directors; No Board Seat for CEO, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
4, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870329400457451383224123 
1354.html (describing the post-Chapter 11 bankruptcy overhaul of Delphi Automotive LLP 
orchestrated by General Motors Co. and dominant lenders); Simeon Gold & Daniel Holzman, 
Shopping for Distressed Companies, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 42 (2008) (describing strategic 
purchases of claims against the debtor in commercial bankruptcies); see also Nathan Bomey, 
Hedge Funds Seeking to Capitalize on Detroit’s Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 25, 2013), 
http://www.freep.com/article/20130825/NEWS01/308250060/Detroit-bankruptcy-hedge-
funds-investors (noting similar behavior by hedge funds in a recent municipal bankruptcy). 
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anticompetitive tactics during the course of the restructuring. For 
instance, in both case studies, surreptitious efforts were made to 
reconfigure the boards of various organizational actors so that they 
would serve the needs of dominant individuals and pressure groups. 
Similarly, dominant creditors in the Washington Mutual case study 
may have engaged in “class gerrymandering” to ensure that a plan 
advancing their profit maximization goals would achieve requisite 
approvals. 330 In each example, dominant interests utilized their 
existing market power to effectively curtail any genuine market 
clearinghouse function that might exist for control of organizational 
actors or of the restructuring generally. In this way, dominant 
stakeholders are able to essentially operate as a cartel, colluding to 
restrict access to, and raise the price of, restructuring outcomes. 
Such steps are taken to maximize individual profits and extract 
rents. 
What is more, by these inefficiencies, Chapter 11 carries 
tremendous deadweight and opportunity costs, as parties divert 
productive resources away from market activity and instead focus 
such resources on gaining control of the restructuring and extracting 
rents.331 The market failure is aided by a legal construct that grants 
structural privileges to large, organizational actors and those 
stakeholders who can use their existing market power to gain 
control. Thus, far from being a competitive environment, commercial 
restructurings under Chapter 11 may have more in common with 
monopolistic environments. 
As political economists have argued for decades, hierarchy, 
authority to act on behalf of others, and the exercise of power all 
create inefficiencies.332 Once analyzed under the new explanatory 
model, Chapter 11 evidences these concerns, as both its consensus- 
and market-based processes appear to be mired by self-dealing, 
conflicts of interest,333 and information asymmetries.334 More to the 
 
 330. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 331. These themes are explored in Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society, AM. ECON. REV., June 1974, at 291; Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, 
Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). 
 332. CARSON, supra note 143, at 2–3. 
 333. Conflicts of interest are common in corporate reorganizations. In a recent empirical 
study, a “majority of professionals and [creditors’] committee members reported being involved 
in cases where . . . a member of the committee possessed a conflict of interest (67.6% of 
professionals and 52.4% of committee members).” Harner & Marincic, supra note 109, at 1172. 
Conflicts arise because committee members harbor conflicting self-interest or consistently 
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point, if the exchanges that occur in Chapter 11 restructurings are 
imperfect or fundamentally anticompetitive, we can paraphrase a 
question raised by Professor Allison with respect to rational actor 
models of state policy decisions: to whose objectives does the 
neoclassical paradigm refer?335 Indeed, the Efficiency Fallacy, and 
the Chapter 11 framework it supports, are undoubtedly called into 
question. 
In essence, even with its modern reliance on market 
mechanisms, Chapter 11 still does not come any closer to achieving 
“an idealized value of the bankrupt that . . . would arise if a perfect 
market were at work,” 336  but rather draws upon principles of 
“instrumental rationality”337 to privilege the profit maximization 
goals of powerful parties. The Efficiency Fallacy provides a 
“calculation that makes plausible the character of the action chosen,” 
drawing primarily upon the observer’s “reasoning,” or ability to 
think through the restructuring problem.338 In other words, the 
Efficiency Fallacy endures, notwithstanding its shortcomings, 
because it is intellectually convenient. It provides justification for 
otherwise unjustifiable extractions of rents from, and assignments of 
economic burdens to, constituents who are largely excluded from the 
legal process. In light of the insights gained from decades of social 
science and legal scholarship in the areas of corporate law and 
bankruptcy, this antiquated and flawed paradigm cannot be 
sustained. Certainly, it cannot be relied upon to guide modern 
efforts to reform Chapter 11. A new explanatory model can generate 
legal reforms that have the power to produce efficiency gains. 
Of course, having argued that Chapter 11 is not necessarily a 
competitive (and therefore efficient) legal mechanism, a deeper 
question emerges: to what extent should Chapter 11 promote 
 
promote the interests of a favored member over the objections of other members. See id. at 
1172–73. These concerns are further explored in Michelle M. Harner, Committee Capture? An 
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
749 (2011). 
 334. Information asymmetries in corporate bankruptcies are explored in Harner, supra note 
63. For instance, “Committee members . . . have access to and may use the corporation’s 
confidential information to advance their own business agendas.” Id. at 474. 
 335. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 247. 
 336. Roe, supra note 34, at 530. 
 337. Instrumental rationality is explored in Owen M. Fiss, Reason in all its Splendor, 56 
BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990). 
 338. ALLISON, supra note 27, at 247. 
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economic efficiency? To be sure, economic efficiency is an important 
consideration because sound commercial restructuring procedures 
facilitate the smooth operation of credit markets. However, even if 
economic efficiency is the desired goal of law and policy, which 
definition of efficiency ought to prevail?339 Finally, to what extent 
should economic efficiency concede to other important societal 
goals, such as equity and fairness? The discourse on the normative 
foundations of Chapter 11 (and corporate finance more broadly) is 
still very much evolving in the wake of the recent financial crisis, and 
a broader, interdisciplinary perspective is needed. By acknowledging 
that the prevailing theoretical construct is not sufficiently complex to 
address the nuances of modern restructurings, we move closer to 
fully engaging these and other essential questions. 
D. Opportunities for Legal Reform 
Broadly speaking, the insights gained from the new explanatory 
model reveal that deeper legal and structural changes are needed 
before we can expect either consensus- or market-based processes to 
yield efficient outcomes in Chapter 11 cases. There is likely a need 
for an enhanced role of the judge in Chapter 11, to monitor 
negotiations and conduct within firms, committees and other 
organizational actors. The case studies suggest that internal 
governance mechanisms do not necessarily create effective 
clearinghouse functions that lead to efficient decision-making by 
organizational actors. Although courts have traditionally directed 
injured stakeholders to pursue their claims via expensive suits to 
recover monetary damages, such recourse ignores the fact that 
internal dynamics can have a direct influence on restructuring 
outcomes. This is particularly true of the debtor’s internal dynamics, 
because in most cases the debtor has the exclusive right to file a 
Chapter 11 plan for a period of 120 days.340 
As one potential solution, bankruptcy courts could more readily 
use their existing statutory powers to address problems that arise 
 
 339. Alternatives to the total welfare model include allocative efficiency and consumer 
welfare models. See Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections 
of an Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in JOSEF DREXL, ET. AL., ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 93 (2008). 
 340. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012). 
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among the debtor’s constituents and its management. 341  In 
particular, courts could utilize their investigative powers to ensure 
that control of large organizational actors is obtained and exercised 
in a legitimate and transparent manner. At a minimum, bankruptcy 
rules should allow the court to routinely pierce the unitary actor 
construct and should strive to expand the scope of persons with 
standing to appear. Where it seems that the debtor is steered by 
faithless fiduciaries or persons who are utilizing market power to 
gain control of the restructuring, then the court might appoint a 
trustee in a full or limited capacity to monitor the proceedings and 
ensure that the goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy process are being 
protected and promoted by the parties.342 In the same fashion, the 
court might appoint an examiner to negotiate on the debtor’s behalf, 
supervise the negotiations, assess potential causes of action or file a 
Chapter 11 plan.343 Alternatively, the court could more carefully 
supervise or replace, where necessary, committees and other agents 
that are entrusted with a fiduciary obligation to represent 
constituent interests. 
Similarly, legal reforms should focus upon ensuring greater 
transparency and accountability, which are essential for the proper 
functioning of market mechanisms.344 As a starting place, reform 
efforts should focus upon enhancing required disclosures of 
organizational actors, with a particular emphasis on more fully 
identifying their constituents’ actual economic interests. For 
instance, Rule 2019 disclosure requirements were updated in 2011 
to include disclosure of hedging transactions and other forms of 
modern financial engineering, to the extent such transactions have 
the potential to impact a person’s actual economic interest in 
relation to the restructuring. 345  However, simultaneous 
 
 341. The court has such powers under 11 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 342. Kelli Alces explores the potential role of a trustee to address situations where the 
debtor’s constituents are highly fractured and/or there are allegations of breaches of fiduciary 
duties. Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83 
(2007). 
 343. Bankruptcy courts are authorized to appoint examiners to carry out any duties of a 
trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform. 11 U.S.C. § 1106. 
 344. IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES 
AND CORPORATIONS? 29 (2010). 
 345. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a)(1) (reflecting 2011 amendments). This is a substantial 
break from tradition, as derivative transactions typically slip through the cracks of most 
disclosure requirements. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit 
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amendments exclude from the rule’s coverage certain entities that 
represent multiple creditors or equity security holders under formal 
legal arrangements of trust or contract law. 346  This exclusion 
bolsters the unitary actor model in the creditor context and also 
allows certain participants in the bankruptcy proceeding to avoid the 
expanded disclosure obligations that are imposed on other, direct 
participants. Thus, in an effort to increase transparency, the more 
expansive, proposed amendment to the rule ought to be 
reconsidered.347 
Likewise, the practice of claims trading should be carefully 
scrutinized, particularly given its potential to further privilege those 
parties who are able to use their market power to “accumulate a 
debtor’s unsecured debt to obtain a seat at the negotiating table.”348 
Such conduct can be detrimental: “Because the creditor is not 
required to disclose its position, and because only select parties are 
privy to the debtor’s restructuring negotiations, the creditor may be 
able to leverage the process to its distinct advantage.”349 In fact, 
recent empirical research suggests a rising degree of influence by 
single creditors or factions of dominant creditors in the restructuring 
process.350 As a result, “[T]he interests of junior stakeholders and 
the company itself may be harmed.”351 The case studies demonstrate 
that claims trading can be utilized for strategic purposes by a variety 
of participants in a Chapter 11 proceeding; and, when combined with 
the practice of class gerrymandering, it allows persons with market 
power to control the plan confirmation process. Specific reforms 
might include increased disclosure requirements to identify new 
ownership in claims and to identify each person’s actual economic 
interest in acquired claims,352 as well as limitations specifically 
designed to curb insider trading violations and strategic acquisition 
of majority stakes for plan confirmation purposes. 
 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007). 
 346. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a)(1) (reflecting 2011 amendments). 
 347. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 96. 
 348. Harner & Marincic, supra note 109, at 1158–59. 
 349. Id. at 1159. 
 350. Id. at 1170. 
 351. Id. at 1159. 
 352. Proposals of this sort are considered in Joy Flowers Conti, Raymond F. Kozlowski, Jr. 
& Leonard S. Ferleger, Claims Trafficking in Chapter 11— Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 9 
BANKR. DEV. J. 281 (1992). 
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Of course, reform proposals of this sort have faced resistance in 
the past. Courts and rule-makers have been sensitive to arguments 
raised by industry groups representing hedge funds and other 
sophisticated investors, who claim that burdensome disclosure 
requirements will impair the functioning of the securities market by 
revealing trading strategies and other confidential investor 
information.353 Similarly, rule-makers have heeded the warning that 
limitations on claims trading will impair the market-based exit and 
entry mechanisms that theoretically enable bankruptcy claims to 
reach the highest value end-users. 
In weighing these policy considerations, modern reformers 
should consider that wherever persons with an interest in a Chapter 
11 case are permitted to organize collectively and act as a group to 
advance positions and gain a seat at the bargaining table, their 
collective action confers benefits that privilege the interests of 
certain stakeholders over those of other stakeholders who are not 
able to effectively organize. These benefits might justify some degree 
of burden, including heightened disclosure requirements or trading 
limitations. In other words, the normative debate must acknowledge 
that while it may be true that increased regulatory requirements in 
commercial bankruptcy can lead to adverse market consequences, 
there are also more immediate inefficiencies that can arise when 
there are no checks on anticompetitive conduct. The key question for 
reformers is not whether inefficiencies will arise, but rather who 
should bear the cost of the inevitable inefficiencies. 
A more dramatic overhaul of Chapter 11 may be necessary. The 
inefficiencies examined in this Article seem likely to worsen in a 
world where secured creditors often claim all of a debtor’s business 
assets,354 and where Chapter 11 is increasingly used to conduct 
corporate liquidations355 or “quasi-liquidations.”356 In such a world, 
 
 353. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae SIFMA and LSTA in Support of Noteholder Group’s 
Objection to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for Order Compelling Ad Hoc Committee to 
Fully Comply with Rule 2019(a) by Filing Complete and Proper Verified Statement Disclosing 
Its Membership and Their Interests at 2, In re Scotia Development, LLC, No. 07-20027 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007).  
 354. This new reality is eloquently described in Harvey R. Miller, Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization Through the Looking Glass of 50 Years (1960-2010), 19 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3 art. 1 
(2010). 
 355. Business debtors increasingly conduct liquidations under Chapter 11 rather than 
Chapter 7. See, e.g., H. Jason Gold & Dylan G. Trache, Liquidation of Troubled Businesses: Chapter 11 
Liquidations Increasing, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL 10 (2009); Michael Cooley, How to Succeed at 
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commercial restructurings do not turn on the debtor’s future ability 
to generate income to repay creditors, as Chapter 11 originally 
contemplated. Rather, they often devolve into disputes over less 
readily calculable and intangible assets, such as contracts and 
pending litigation claims, or the future ability to utilize tax benefits, 
such as net operating loss carryforwards. 357  As a result, the 
restructuring process becomes even more political, with negotiations 
focusing on the distribution of economic burdens, on one hand, and 
the exploitation of rent-seeking opportunities, on the other. In 
situations of this sort, the risk of self-dealing, conflicts of interest, 
opportunism, information asymmetries and collective action 
obstacles becomes even higher, as parties stand to gain substantial 
advantages by aligning early in the process with the debtor and its 
management or with powerful stakeholders who control the 
debtor.358 
Thus, perhaps the present model, which relies upon and 
facilitates the formation of coalitions to reach negotiated settlements 
in Chapter 11 proceedings ought to be reconsidered. Similarly, 
perhaps the debtor-in-possession model, which allows the distressed 
company and its management to initially advance a Chapter 11 
plan,359 is not the most efficient model—particularly in cases such as 
Washington Mutual, where the debtor bears little resemblance to the 
business enterprise that prospered in better days. Rather, a trustee 
or court-appointed chief restructuring officer might better serve 
these essential functions. Similarly, reliance on committees 
composed of the largest claim holders to advance claimants’ interests 
may no longer be appropriate in a world where sophisticated persons 
routinely hedge large investments, and where distressed debt 
investors trade in the debtor’s securities throughout the pendency of 
 
Chapter 11 Without Really Reorganizing, J. OF CORP. RENEWAL (Aug. 27, 2008), 
http:www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=9654; Stephen J. Lubben, 
Business Liquidation, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2007); see also 9C Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy §2818; BEN 
BRANCH ET AL., LAST RIGHTS: LIQUIDATING A COMPANY (2007). 
 356. In a so-called quasi-liquidation, the debtor liquidates its operating subsidiary and 
reorganizes the corporate parent—typically to preserve the future benefit of valuable tax 
attributes. See The Solyndra Memorial Tax Break, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444799904578050803545600588.html. 
 357. See id. Loss carryforwards are determined under 26 U.S.C. § 172. 
 358. These early alliances enable stakeholders to influence the Chapter 11 plan during the 
debtor’s exclusivity period. See supra note 340 and source cited therein. 
 359. See supra note 340 and source cited therein. 
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the case. It might better serve the goals of bankruptcy if parties 
advocated separately for their own interests. 
 
Finally, while market-based processes may in theory offer the 
potential for increased participation in the restructuring by a broader 
range of constituents, they take place within a legal framework that 
grants structural privileges to certain parties. Accordingly, they are 
susceptible to the same problems that early critics of Chapter 11 
identified, and in fact they can provide a ready mechanism for parties 
to use their market power to gain more opportunities to crowd out 
dissent to their desired restructuring outcome. Thus, 
notwithstanding increasing integration of market mechanisms, 
negotiations by parties to Chapter 11 cases must be carefully 
monitored to ensure that they do not enhance market inequalities 
and enable the exercise of market power. 
To be sure, reforms of this sort would in many cases add to the 
existing litigation burdens of the bankruptcy process. However, the 
distributional and burden-assigning effects of Chapter 11 must be 
recognized, in addition to its inherent inefficiencies. As reform 
efforts take shape, protective rules and policies should be considered 
to allow meaningful participation in Chapter 11 restructurings by 
persons other than dominant parties with market power. Moreover, 
given bankruptcy law’s historic deference to efficiency goals, Chapter 
11 must be carefully assessed to ensure that it does not “permit[] 
private actors with powerful economic interests to pursue self-
interest free of community norms.”360 Of course, in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, the law of corporate financial distress is 
simply one component of a much larger space that demands careful 
attention from scholars and reformers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Owen Fiss observed, “To say . . . that ‘law is 
efficiency,’ implicitly hypothesizes a single, uncontested end and 
relegates the judge to formulating rules—the instruments—that best 
serve that end.”361 Chapter 11 rests upon a neoclassical economic 
paradigm that promises efficient outcomes to the extent market 
 
 360. Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 n.33 
(1985). 
 361. Fiss, supra note 337, at 792. 
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mechanisms are utilized. Through its reliance on outmoded and 
facile theoretical assumptions, Chapter 11 relegates not judges, but 
certain privileged parties to formulating the instruments that best 
serve their own profit maximization goals. But when more 
comprehensive narratives of corporate financial distress are told, the 
extant legal process reveals itself to be anything but economically 
efficient. 
In reality, the structural limitations of Chapter 11 produce 
distortions that cause even the most sensibly designed market 
mechanisms to yield inefficient case outcomes. By obscuring these 
inefficiencies, the legal construct achieves a largely unquestioned 
distributional effect, privileging certain actors and enabling them to 
dominate restructuring outcomes and extract rents. In light of the 
distributional functions achieved by Chapter 11, constituents are 
routinely forced to bear economic burdens even though they have 
been effectively barred from the legal process. To this end, it is 
difficult to argue—particularly in the wake of the Great Recession—
that the restructuring process offered by Chapter 11 advances overall 
societal welfare by any measure. 
Once the Efficiency Fallacy is exposed and set aside, we are left 
with tremendous opportunities for law reform. And there is much 
work to be done. As other scholars have observed, the commercial 
restructuring process needs to be more inclusive and transparent,362 
and efforts to reform Chapter 11 are underway. A new explanatory 
model, drawing on the analytical tools of modern political economy, 
allows an expanded narrative of corporate financial distress. The 
stories that emerge might pave the way for an overhauled legal 
construct that achieves more efficient restructurings. More 
importantly, these stories permit acknowledgment of—and thus an 
opportunity to ameliorate—the inequitable distributional effects that 
worsen financial distress and ultimately undercut economic progress. 
 
 
 362. “Encouraging more parties to participate may enhance that dialogue by introducing 
additional and potentially different perspectives on value creation. The challenge is preserving a 
relatively level and fair playing field among the stakeholders so that all voices are heard.” Harner 
& Marincic, supra note 109, at 1182. 
